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Abstract of the dissertation
A Neural Network for Uncertainty Anticipation and Information Seeking
by
J. Kael White
Doctor of Philosophy in Biology and Biomedical Sciences
Neurosciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Assistant Professor Ilya E. Monosov, Chair

In a world flooded with ‘click bait’, ‘alternative facts’, and ‘fake news’ one’s ability to
seek out, discern, and value information is of utmost importance. Although contemporary
phenomena, these cultural ills take advantage of an evolutionarily-preserved drive for humans
and nonhuman animals to monitor for and pursue opportunities to gain information. Indeed, in a
natural environment where rewards are scarce and can be risky, animals often seek sensory cues
as a source of information about future outcomes. Interestingly, humans and nonhuman animals
will seek sensory information that provides advance information that predicts an outcome even
when this information does not influence the event outcome or may even come at a cost to the
eventual reward. This willingness to ‘pay’ for information, despite being unable to impact task
outcome, indicates that the information itself has intrinsic value to subjects. But how and where
in the brain are opportunities to learn new information about uncertain events signaled? How
does the brain guide behavior towards pursuing this information? Elucidating these mechanisms
would expand our understanding of how information seeking interacts with primary reward

ix

seeking in naturalistic environments and could further inform theories of attention, learning, and
economic decision-making.
Here, I demonstrate that connected regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
striatum, and pallidum contain neurons whose activity is selectively modulated by the presence
and levels of outcome uncertainty. I describe the response of these neurons, many of which
anticipate the resolution of uncertainty about an outcome— including when it is resolved through
the animal seeking advance information. Finally, I demonstrate that the neural activity within
areas of basal ganglia in this ‘uncertainty circuit’ causally contributes to information-seeking
behaviors observed in nonhuman primates. This work demonstrates that connected regions of the
brain previously associated with responses to primary rewards and motivation also contain a
mechanism for anticipating uncertainty resolution and directing behaviors towards pursuing
information that reduces uncertainty about upcoming events.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the dissertation
To begin this chapter, I provide an overview of information-seeking behaviors in human
and nonhuman animals and how these behaviors might be useful in an uncertain world.
Thereafter, I describe the role of the striatum in contributing to motivated and reward-related
behaviors and as an integrator of cortical and midbrain signals. I then provide an overview of the
organization of cortico-basal ganglia loops and the role of these networks in motivating animal
behavior. Finally, I describe the connectivity and functions of connected areas of ACC and basal
ganglia; I detail their roles signaling reward uncertainty and motivating reward-related behaviors
and explain why this network is a good candidate for the signaling of upcoming uncertainty
resolution and information availability. In sum, I will present an argument that these brain
regions- already heavily implicated in motivating behavior towards primary reward- are ideal
candidate regions for the investigation of the mechanisms by which the brain anticipates
uncertainty resolution and drives behavior towards pursuing information about upcoming
rewards.
1.1 Animals exist in an uncertain world and are motivated to reduce uncertainty through
seeking information
We live in an uncertain world in which outcomes are variable, choices are risky, and the
future is not often predicted with precision. Therefore, humans and other animals accurately
estimating and reducing uncertainty can increase success in maximizing rewarding outcomes.
Uncertainty can arise from a number of sources.1 For example, someone could be uncertain
about the past because of imperfections in memory, or uncertain about the current state of the
world because of noisy or limited senses, such as imperfections in vision. This thesis will focus
1

primarily on outcome uncertainty, which arises when an animal is unsure about which events- or
outcomes- will occur in the future. A common source of outcome uncertainty- and one which
will be investigated extensively within this thesis- is that of economic risk, where the possible
outcomes, timing, and probabilities of an outcome in a given situation are understood by the
subject, but where the outcome itself remains unknown until the animal experiences the outcome
event.2,3
For example, although one may understand the (dismally low) odds of winning in a
lottery system such as the Powerball, the outcome of a ticket remains uncertain until when the
numbers for the winner are drawn. Contrast this with an envelope that contains a dollar amount
equal to the average yield of the lottery ticket (e.g.: $2.00). Where both objects share an expected
value, the ticket has a degree of uncertainty (is risky) where the envelope has none (is safe).
Humans and nonhuman animals often have strong preferences for choosing between certain and
uncertain outcomes. For example, a gambling person might tend to choose the lottery ticket (risk
seeking) while a more conservative person might tend to choose the envelope (risk averse).
How uncertainty guides behavior in humans and nonhuman animals is an interesting and
ongoing topic of research in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and economics. For
example, uncertainty about an outcome can enhance learning2–6, promote risk-seeking3,7, and
influence choice behavior1,2,4,8 and emotional state.1,9 Consistent with these observations of
uncertainty’s diverse influence on behavior, subsequent studies demonstrated that many brain
regions are modulated by uncertainty. For example, human fMRI studies indicated that multiple
regions of the brain, including the striatum10,11 and many areas of the neocortex12–14, are
modulated by outcome uncertainty. Single-unit recordings indicated that the activity of
individual neurons across the brain is modulated by reward uncertainty15–22. Although these
2

studies offer insight into how activity in different brain regions is modulated by uncertainty, the
field has yet to determine the neural mechanisms by which the brain anticipates uncertain
outcomes, values uncertain rewards, and drives behaviors towards reducing uncertainty about the
future.
How is it that uncertainty about the future can be reduced? By obtaining information
about an outcome in advance, animals can resolve uncertainty about an outcome prior to it
occurring. Take, as an example, the risk-seeking gambler from above: imagine that she pulls the
lever on a slot machine in which the symbols spin for 10 seconds before their identities are
revealed and the outcome (i.e.: a win or a loss) occurs. In this scenario she would be in a state of
uncertainty about the outcome until the symbols stop spinning and it occurs. Alternatively,
imagine if the machine contained a button that, when pressed, would reveal the identity of the
symbols immediately but the outcome would only occur 10 seconds after the lever was pulled. In
this second situation uncertainty was resolved at an earlier timepoint through the delivery of
advance information about the outcome. Importantly, the timing and the outcome of the gamble
is constant across these scenarios; the only difference between them is that uncertainty was
resolved in the latter at an earlier timepoint.
Pioneering behavioral experiments demonstrated that animals often prefer uncertain
outcomes to be resolved at an early timepoint and will preferentially exhibit ‘observing
responses’ which provide information about upcoming reinforcing outcomes.23 This research has
been replicated in subjects ranging from pigeons, to rats, to nonhuman primates23–28 and suggests
that animals across a wide range of species readily learn these observing behaviors. Indeed, in
the field of economics, for example, similar preferences for this early information in human
subjects were reported across a number of studies.29–31 That is, when given the option to reveal
3

the outcome of an uncertain situation, humans will choose to do so at the earliest possible
moment, even when this information cannot be used to impact the outcome or give the subject
any advantage in the task. Interestingly, this desire is strong enough that both humans31 and
nonhuman primates28 will exchange a portion of their upcoming reward in order to obtain this
advance information about task outcome.
Despite the prevalence of these observing and information-seeking behaviors, the neural
mechanisms that drive and maintain them remain unclear. One proposal is that these behaviors
are supported by neural circuits that overlap with those that underlie conventional rewardseeking behaviors.26 It is suggested that midbrain dopamine neurons, for example, are important
for reward learning and motivated behavior.32–36 The activity of many of these neurons transmits
a reward prediction error (RPE).35,37 An RPE is a signal of the difference between the expected
value of an outcome and the delivered value of an outcome. RPE signals within the brain could
contribute to computing the value of rewarding actions and reinforce actions that maximize
primary rewards over a period of time.32,33 Such a signal could contribute substantially to
learning, memory, and motivated behaviors.34 Although RPE-based reinforcement learning has
the power to explain much of what motivates animals to pursue primary rewards37–39, behaviors
that show preference for this advance information would not be predicted by this model.
Consider a secondary cue that gives information about a coin toss: a 50/50 chance of either a
positive or negative outcome. Because the chances of this cue providing a positive RPE is the
same as it providing a negative RPE, the secondary cue-seeking behavior would not be
reinforced as the overall RPE would be neutral. Although multiple models have been
proposed27,40–42 to explain this gap in our understanding, the exact mechanisms that support these
behaviors remain unclear.
4

A recent study26 looking at midbrain dopamine neurons reported a similar response to
advance information. Much like RPEs with primary rewards, ‘information prediction errors’
(IPEs) were higher when there was more information about outcome than expected and lower
when there was less information about outcome than expected. Other information-related
patterns of response are also observed in other motivational brain areas, including one of the
major inputs to midbrain dopamine neurons, the lateral habenula27 as well as areas of
neocortex.28 Taken together with the behavioral preferences for information seen in both human
and nonhuman animals, these findings support the idea that the brain might use overlapping
neural systems to motivate the pursuit of primary rewards and the pursuit of information about
upcoming rewards.
Despite the importance of uncertainty resolution and information seeking to everyday life,
the mechanisms that underlie these behaviors remains largely unknown. Where and how does the
brain represent levels of uncertainty and availability of information? Further, which brain area or
areas are capable of motivating animals to reduce uncertainty and seek information?
1.2 The striatum has a demonstrated role in reward-evaluation, reward-seeking, and other
motivated behaviors
The striatum is the primary input structure of a set of subcortical structures known as the
basal ganglia and has long been considered an integrator43–47 of glutamatergic signals from
cortex48–50 and dopaminergic signals from the midbrain.51–54 Of particular interest to this
integration are medium spiny neurons (MSNs), which make up the vast majority of neurons
found in the striatum and are a major target of midbrain dopamine neurons. The excitatory
response of the MSNs to cortical input is modulated by dopamine as well as by the activity of
largely inhibitory populations of local interneurons.55–57 Within the striatum, synapses from
5

cortical inputs are preferentially contacted by projections from midbrain dopamine neurons
relative to those that originate from thalamus.55 These synaptic interactions are thought to
underlie the roles of the striatum in supporting motivated, reward-related behaviors.
A large and growing body of literature has identified reward-related signals in the
striatum and broadly implicates its role in motivational and reward-related behaviors. For
example, early human PET experiments found increased levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine
in subjects both with the stimulation of primary food reward58 as well as rewarding epochs in a
video game.59 Later fMRI experiments verified that the striatum responds while subjects learned
and anticipated rewarding outcomes60–64 and that these responses could be influenced by varying
the properties of these rewards, such as reward magnitude and timing.62,65–67 Similarly,
physiological recordings within the dorsal regions of this structure have demonstrated that
activity in this region represents the anticipation68,69 and delivery70,71 of primary reward, actiondependent rewards72–75, and that it contains signals capable of directing an animal’s gaze towards
rewarding outcomes.76–79 In line with these findings, studies that manipulated striatal activity
found that doing so changes reward-driven behaviors in a number of ways. Lesions and
inactivations of the striatum yielded strong effects, including changes in reward-choice
behaviors80,81, and learning and habituation.82–84 Injection of muscimol, a GABAA agonist into
striatum resulted in decreases in reward-learning85, choice86, and feeding behaviors80,81 and
resulted in decreased performance in reward-related tasks, as well as slower response times to
preferred rewards.80,85 Additionally, pharmacologically manipulating activity in separate regions
of striatum resulted in different effects during interactions with rewards.87 In sum, these studies
suggest that neuronal activity within the striatum is not only modulated by the presence and
properties of reward, but that it also causally influences reward-driven action.
6

1.3 Cortico-basal ganglia networks contribute to and refine motivated behaviors
Projections from the frontal cortex to the striatum are organized and are thought to often
follow stereotyped functional and topographical pathways.45,50,88,89 An early anatomical study
suggested90 that these pathways compose closed “loops” from specific regions of cortex, to basal
ganglia, to thalamus, and back to cortex. In this way, partially overlapping inputs from the cortex
are integrated and refined along the progression of the circuit and “funneled” back into a single
area of cortex. Activity across these circuits is segregated to specific areas with sensory, motor,
or associative functions.90 These neural circuits provide the framework for cortico-striatal
interactions that could contribute widely to reward seeking and motivated behaviors.
Additionally, these closed loops explain observed similarities in function between
anatomically-connected areas of cortex and striatum. For example, there are established
projections91–94 from motor, pre-motor, and somatosensory cortex to caudal dorsolateral striatum.
Activity in this region of striatum contributes to sensorimotor behaviors, such as learned and
innate sequential actions95–99, motor learning and planning72,100–104, and habit formation.72,105–107
Similarly, projections from orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex broadly innervate areas of
rostromedial dorsal striatum as well as ventral striatum.46,89,92,108 These areas of striatum
contribute to goal-directed behaviors109–111 and reward learning112–115 and, further, dysregulation
of these areas and their connections have been implicated in a number of mental illnesses.116–121
Projections from additional areas of prefrontal cortex, such as the dorsolateral and medial
prefrontal cortex- including areas of ACC- project broadly to rostrodorsal striatum.48,122–124 This
innervation could provide signals that influence more cognitive processes, such as working
memory125–130 and behavioral flexibility.131–134 Taken together, the connections that compose the
broad networks of cortico-striatal projections create a rough topographical organization between
7

cortex and the striatum that contributes broadly to a wide-ranging repertoire of motivated
behaviors.
Although projections from cortex to striatum have often been considered parallel and
segregated along this topographical map, there is growing evidence to suggest that the loops that
they form are more overlapped than previously understood.46,50,135,136 The processes by which
information is exchanged across these circuits is believed to be at least partially dependent on
cross-over connections that exist within and downstream of the basal ganglia.136–139 These
integrating nodes across cortico-basal ganglia loops that convey different properties of a situation
could underlie evaluation of more complex object-outcome relationships than entirely segregated
networks. In line with this concept, both associative and cognitive signals63,101,107,109,114,140,141
have been reported broadly throughout areas of the striatum that were believed at one point to be
largely dedicated to motor functions. Overall, it is currently understood that networks that
encompass regions of cortex and basal ganglia contribute broadly to motivated behaviors,
particularly to those which are directed at rewarding outcomes.
1.4 Signals related to uncertain rewards are present in anatomically-connected regions of
cortex and basal ganglia that motivate behavior towards primary rewards
In order for the brain to promote information-seeking behaviors, neural mechanisms
which monitor uncertainty should be tightly linked to those which underlie motivational
processes. The striatum plays a key role in reward-seeking and motivational behaviors and as
such might be an ideal candidate to fulfill this role. But where in the striatum might we expect to
find uncertainty-related activity? Drawing inspiration from the cortico-basal ganglia loops
discussed previously, it would likely be a region of striatum that share connections with areas of
cortex and other areas of basal ganglia which have strong responses to uncertainty. In this way,
8

this region of striatum could process uncertainty signals from cortex and project them further
into the basal ganglia to drive behavior.
Recently, single-unit recordings of neurons in ACC determined that largely separate
populations of neurons respond to appetitive and aversive uncertain outcomes.15 The mostly
excitatory activity of different populations of these neurons signaled information about the
uncertainty of juice rewards and air-puff punishments. These findings compliment the
demonstrated role of ACC in the control of cognitive functions and motivated behaviors aimed at
both optimizing rewards142–146 and avoiding punishments.147–149 Supporting this role are
observations that the ACC contains individual neurons which respond to the presence of
rewarding stimuli in ways which correspond to both the value of rewards144–146,150 and the
effort151–153 required to obtain it. In line with these findings are hypotheses which suggest that
ACC contributes to value-based decision-making behaviors.143–145 A growing number of human
imaging studies also reported higher-order signals related to learning and exploration, which are
oftentimes related to the expectation of uncertain outcomes4,9,154,155
A recent study has identified a subset of neurons within VP that responded selectively to
uncertainty. These cells showed a strong and consistent decrease in their firing before the
delivery of uncertain rewards.16 This study contributes to other proposals that areas of pallidumparticularly the ventral extent of the structure- are implicated in the mechanisms of reward and
motivation. For example, self-stimulation studies reported that animals will repeatedly press a
lever for pallidal stimulations156–158 and that injection of bicuculline, a GABAA antagonist,
resulted in increased food consumption.159–161 Conversely, lesion studies found that damaging
areas of ventral pallidum (VP) resulted in failures to eat and drink in rodents162–164, indicating
that the structure has a role in hedonic drive. Interestingly, one study of the ventral pallidum
9

found that lesioned animals not just reduce, but reverse, their pursuit of reward.163 Clinical
studies in humans with damaged pallidum found that a patient once addicted to alcohol and other
drugs no longer experienced cravings and reported a depressive mood and a generally
despondent demeanor165; similarly, a second patient with damage to an overlapping area reported
the inability to feel strong emotions and a general lack of motivation following the lesion.166
But is there a striatal link between these cortical and basal ganglia uncertainty signals?
Specific and overlapping areas of the dorsal striatum receive both glutamatergic projections from
ACC and share mutual GABAergic connections with the ventral pallidum.46,48,50 Interestingly,
these areas of ACC and pallidum are also highly overlapped with those where uncertaintyresponsive cells were reported.15,16 Could it be that these regions of the dorsal striatum contain a
mechanism for signaling levels of reward uncertainty? Further, might this interconnected
network of brain structures, some of which have a demonstrated role in predicting uncertain
outcomes and motivating behavior towards primary rewards, contribute to an animal’s
motivation to seek information about uncertain rewards?
1.5 Summary
For a brain area or areas to be implicated in motivating behaviors towards seeking
information, they must not only monitor the environment for levels of uncertainty surrounding
future events, but also anticipate when information that resolves this uncertainty is available.
Further, it must be demonstrated that interrupting the activity of these areas causally reduces
information-seeking behaviors. In the following chapters we will describe the experimental
results of testing areas of ACC and basal ganglia for responses to outcome uncertainty and
anticipation of information about upcoming outcomes. In Chapter 2 we report a selective and
anticipatory response to uncertain reward delivery within the striatum, specifically regions of
10

caudate nucleus and putamen which border the internal capsule (icbDS). We interrogate this
response further across various reward schedules and task conditions. We continue with Chapter
3 where we describe and compare the responses of anatomically-connected regions of ACC and
basal ganglia (icbDS and VP) to reward uncertainty. We then test the response of each area when
advance information about uncertain outcomes is available to determine if these areas are
anticipating the delivery of uncertain outcomes, or if their response is to uncertainty resolution
more broadly. Thereafter, we investigate looking behaviors which are associated with
uncertainty and information-seeking and demonstrate that pharmacological manipulation of areas
of this putative ‘information-seeking’ circuit results in decreased information-seeking biases. In
sum, we identify a novel neural network which participates in signaling the resolution of reward
uncertainty across multiple modalities and demonstrate that the activity of this network causally
contributes to information-seeking behaviors in primates.
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Chapter 2: Neurons in the primate dorsal striatum signal the
uncertainty of object–reward associations
Adapted from:
J. Kael White & Ilya E. Monosov
Neurons in the primate dorsal striatum signal the uncertainty of object-reward associations.
Nature Communications, 2016. Article number: 12735 doi: 10.1038/ncomms1273
To learn, obtain reward and survive, humans and other animals must monitor, approach
and act on objects that are associated with variable or unknown rewards. However, the neuronal
mechanisms that mediate behaviors aimed at uncertain objects are poorly understood. Here we
demonstrate that a set of neurons in internal-capsule bordering regions of the primate dorsal
striatum, within the putamen and caudate nucleus, signal the uncertainty of object–reward
associations. Their uncertainty responses depend on the presence of objects associated with
reward uncertainty and evolve rapidly as monkeys learn novel object–reward associations.
Therefore, beyond its established role in mediating actions aimed at known or certain rewards,
the dorsal striatum also participates in behaviors aimed at reward-uncertain objects.

2.1

Introduction
To survive, humans and other animals must act on objects that have been previously

associated with certain or reliable rewards.107,167,168 However, learning, foraging and decisionmaking also require animals to monitor, approach and act on objects associated with variable or
unknown rewards4,18,155,169, even when the mean reward value of such uncertain objects is lower
than that of other objects.1,170,171 To date, the mechanisms that direct behavior towards uncertain
objects are not well understood.
Expected (or certain) reward-driven behaviors are in part dependent on the caudate–
putamen complex73–75, also called the dorsal striatum (DS). In primates, the caudate nucleus in
12

particular has recently been shown to contain multiple mechanisms for directing gaze at objects
associated with high reward values.76–79 Here we asked if the primate DS also contains a
mechanism to support behavior aimed at objects associated with outcome uncertainty.
Our experiments showed that a subset of neurons, mostly in the internal-capsule bordering
regions of the DS (icbDS), was preferentially activated by visual objects associated with rewarduncertain outcomes. Furthermore, the icbDS reward-uncertainty responses greatly depended on
the presence of visual objects associated with reward uncertainty because they were reduced
when the object was removed before the uncertain outcome was delivered. These uncertainty
responses occurred when subjects were presented with objects that were associated with
uncertain either due to the subjects’ lack of knowledge or due to known uncertainty (also called
risk3,172) but carried no spatial or specific object information. Finally, during object–reward
associative learning, icbDS neurons’ uncertainty responses evolved rapidly as monkeys learned
novel object–reward associations.
Our experiments suggest that uncertainty-sensitive neurons in the primate DS may play
important roles in object-based behaviors under uncertainty.

2.2

Materials and methods

2.2.1 General procedures
Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for the neurophysiology
experiments in the DS (Monkeys B who is 6 years old; and Monkey W who is 5.25 years old).
All procedures conformed to the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were
approved by the Washington University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. A plastic
head holder and plastic recording chamber were fixed to the right side of the skull under general
anesthesia and sterile surgical conditions. The chambers were tilted laterally by 35° and aimed at
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the anterior portion of the striatum. After the monkeys recovered from surgery, they participated
in the behavioral and neurophysiological experiments.
2.2.2 Data acquisition
While the monkeys participated in the behavioral procedures we recorded single neurons
in the right DS. The recording sites were determined with 1 mm-spacing grid system and with
the aid of magnetic resonance images (3 T) obtained along the direction of the recording
chamber. This magnetic resonance imaging-based estimation of neuron recording locations was
aided by custom-built software (PyElectrode). Single-unit recording was performed using glasscoated electrodes (Alpha Omega). The electrode was inserted into the brain through a stainlesssteel guide tube and advanced by an oil-driven micromanipulator (MO-97A, Narishige). Signal
acquisition (including amplification and filtering) was performed using Alpha Omega 44 kHz
SNR system. Action potential waveforms were identified online by multiple time-amplitude
windows with an additional template-matching algorithm (Alpha-Omega). Neuronal recording
was restricted to single neurons that were isolated online. Neuronal and behavioral analyses were
conducted offline in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA).
Eye position was obtained with an infrared video camera (Eyelink, SR Research).
Behavioral events and visual stimuli were controlled by Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions. Juice, used as reward, was delivered with a solenoid delivery
reward system (CRIST Instruments). Juice-related anticipatory licking during the CS epoch was
measured and quantified using previously described methods.17
2.2.3 Behavioral tasks
2.2.3.1 Reward-probability and reward-amount procedure (experiment 1)

14

The reward-probability and reward-amount behavioral procedure consisted of two blocks,
a reward-probability block and a reward-amount block (Figure 2.1). In the reward-probability
block, three visual fractal CSs were followed by a liquid reward (0.25 ml of juice) with 100, 50
and 0% chance, respectively. In the reward-amount block, three CSs were followed by a liquid
reward of 0.25, 0.125 and 0 ml, respectively. Thus, the expected values of the three CSs matched
between the probability and amount blocks. To control for neuronal object preference, we used
two fractal sets (that is, for every CS there were two different fractals).
Each trial started with the presentation of a green trial-start cue at the center. The
monkeys had to maintain fixation on the trial-start cue for 1 s; then the trial-start cue disappeared
and one of the three CSs was presented pseudo randomly. After 2.5 s, the CS disappeared, and
juice (if scheduled for that trial) was delivered. The monkeys were not required to fixate on the
CSs. In each trial, the CS could appear in three locations: 10° to the left or to the right of the
trial-start cue, or in the center. One block consisted of 18 trials with fixed proportions of trial
types (each of the three CSs appears three times each block, 9/18 trials total).
In the remainder of the trials in each block (9/18), the monkeys chose amongst the task
CSs. Each trial started with the presentation of a purple trial-start cue at the center, and the
monkeys had to fixate it for 0.5 s. After the monkey fixated on the trial start cue for 0.5 s, a
choice array was presented consisting of two fractals used in the Pavlovian procedure (shown in
Figure 2.1A). The monkey had to continue to fixate until the trial start cue disappeared (0.5 s).
Monkeys then made saccadic eye movements to their preferred reward-associated fractals and
fixated them for 0.75 s to indicate their choices. Then, the unchosen stimulus disappeared, and
the monkeys waited for 1 s to receive the scheduled outcome (associated with their chosen
fractal).
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The inter-trial intervals ranged from 3 to 6 s. Approximately one in five inter-trial
intervals contained uncued events (chosen randomly). These could be either a juice reward alone
(0.25 ml) or an ∼70 dB 0.15 s auditory white noise burst paired with a brief change in screen
color (same duration as the auditory stimulus).
Neuronal recordings did not begin until the monkeys chose the CSs associated with
higher expected value over CSs associated with lower expected value >90% of the time. The
monkeys’ knowledge of the CSs was further confirmed when we measured the monkeys’ licking
behavior. The magnitude of licking was correlated to the reward value of the fractals in the
reward-probability block (P<0.001; Spearman’s rank correlation) and the reward-amount blocks
(P<0.001; Spearman’s rank correlation).
2.2.3.2 Five reward-probability and reward-amount procedure (experiment 2)
The reward-probability and reward-amount behavioral procedure consisted of two blocks,
a reward-probability block and a reward-amount block. The trial structure was the same as in
experiment 1. However, here the reward-probability block contained five objects associated with
five probabilistic reward predictions (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% of 0.25 ml of juice) and a rewardamount block that contained five objects associated with 100% reward predictions of varying
reward amounts (0.25, 0.1875, 0.125, 0.065 and 0 ml).17,18 One block consisted of 20 trials with
fixed proportions of trial types (each of the five CSs appears four times each block).
2.2.3.3 Trace reward-probability procedure (experiment 3)
The temporal structure of this procedure was the same as in probability-amount
procedure (experiment 1). The trace procedure contained four possible distinct CS fractals. The
first two CSs were associated with 100% (CS 1) and 50% (CS 2) chance of 0.25 ml of juice.
These CSs remained on the screen for 2.5 s and were followed by the scheduled reward outcome.
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(same as in experiment 1). The other two CSs were also associated with 100% (CS 3) and 50%
(CS 4) chance of 0.25 ml of juice but were only presented for 1 s. This was followed by a 1.5 s
trace period, during which the screen did not contain any stimulus. The trace period was
followed by the scheduled reward outcome. Therefore, in both trace and non-trace conditions,
monkeys experienced two types of reward predictions (certain and uncertain) and experienced
outcome delivery in 2.5 s after the initial CS presentation.
2.2.3.4 Object learning procedure (experiment 4)
Instead of using previously conditioned object fractals, monkeys were exposed to three
novel CSs associated with 100, 50 and 0% chance of reward delivery. The task design and
temporal structure of the trials were the same as in probability-amount procedure (experiment 1).
However, the interleaved choice trials were choice trials amongst the three novel fractals.
2.2.3.5 Appetitive-aversive procedure
The procedure consisted of two alternating blocks: appetitive and aversive.15 In the
appetitive block, three visual fractal CSs were followed by a liquid reward (0.4 ml of juice) with
100%, 50% and 0% chance, respectively. In the aversive block, three visual fractal CSs were
followed by an air puff with 100%, 50% and 0% chance, respectively. Airpuff (∼35 psi) was
delivered through a narrow tube placed 6–8 cm from the monkey’s face. Temporal structure of
the trials was the same as in other procedures, but here monkeys were not required to fixate the
trial start cue. Each block consisted of 12 trials with fixed proportions of trial types (100%, four
trials; 50%, four trials; 0%, four trials).
2.2.4 Data processing and statistics
Spike-density functions were generated by convolving spike times with a Gaussian filter
(σ=50 ms). To display single neuron examples (Figs 1a, 3a, and 4a) spike-density functions were
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generated by convolving spike times with a 100 ms Gaussian filter. A neuron was defined as
uncertainty sensitive if its responses varied across the four possible reward predictions (100%
0.25, 50% 0.25, 100% 0.125 and 0 ml of juice) (Kruskal–Wallis test, P<0.01; analysis window:
100 ms after CS presentation until outcome) and if its response to the uncertain CS (50%) was
significantly stronger or weaker than its responses to both 100 and 0% reward CSs (two-tailed
rank-sum test; P<0.01). The same analysis window was used to study neuronal activity during
the CS epoch in Figure 2.2C.
To normalize task-event-related responses, we subtracted baseline activity (the last
500 ms of the inter-trial interval) from the activity during the task-event-related measurement
epoch. All statistical tests were two-tailed. For comparisons between two task conditions for
each neuron, we used a rank-sum test, unless otherwise noted. For comparisons between two task
conditions across the population average we used a paired signed-rank test, unless otherwise
noted. Statistical threshold throughout this study is P<0.01 unless otherwise noted.
To assess the sensitivity of individual uncertainty-selective striatal neurons to task-related
variables in Experiment 1 (Figure 2.2C), we obtained their response indices (difference between
neuronal responses to two conditions divided by their sum). To assess CS spatial location
sensitivity, we compared responses to the 50% CS when it was shown 10° to the right versus 10°
to the left of center. To assess object-feature sensitivity, we compared responses to two distinct
50% CS fractal objects. Reward-value sensitivity was assessed by comparing neuronal responses
to 100% 0.25 ml CS versus 0.125 ml CS. Reward-context sensitivity was assessed by comparing
CS activity in certain reward trials (100% 0.25 and 0.125 ml CS trials) versus no reward trials.
Uncertainty sensitivity was assessed by comparing responses to 50% reward CSs with 100%
reward CSs. Reward prediction error sensitivity was assessed by comparing reward versus no18

reward responses after the 50% reward prediction (in the 250 ms window after the outcome).
Neuronal responses during experiments 2–4 were measured in the last 500 ms before the trial
outcome.
To calculate receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) that assessed neuronal
discrimination of uncertainty, we compared spike-density functions of 100% reward CS trials
and 50% reward CS trials. The analysis was structured so that receiver-operating characteristic
area values >0.5 indicate that the activity in the 50% reward CS trials is greater than in the 100%
reward CS trials values <0.5 indicate that the activity in the 100% reward CS trials is greater than
in the 50% reward CS trials.

2.3

Results

2.3.1 DS neurons selectively signal reward uncertainty
To test if the primate DS contains neurons that are preferentially activated by visual
objects associated with reward-uncertain outcomes, we recorded 141 single neurons from DS
while two monkeys (B, n=103 neurons; W, n=38 neurons) participated in a behavioral procedure
that was composed of two distinct blocks: a reward-probability block, in which three visual
conditioned stimuli (CSs) predicted a 0.25 ml juice reward with 100, 50 and 0% chance; and a
reward-amount block, in which three CSs predicted 0.25, 0.125 and 0 ml of juice (experiment 1,
Figure 2.1A). For each block, we used two fractal sets that could appear in one of three spatial
locations. Monkeys’ knowledge of the task was tested with interleaved choice trials (Methods),
and neuronal recordings did not begin until the monkeys chose the CSs associated with higher
expected value over CSs associated with lower expected value >90% of the time (Figure 2.1B).
Uncertainty-sensitive neurons were defined as those that varied their responses across the
task CSs (Kruskal–Wallis test; P<0.01) and displayed significantly stronger responses to the
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50% CS than to both 100 and 0% reward CSs or weaker responses to 50% CS than to both 100
and 0% reward CSs (two-tailed rank-sum tests; P<0.01). We found that 45/141 neurons, mostly
in the internal-capsule bordering regions of the striatum, were selectively activated by reward
uncertainty (n=19 in monkey W; n=26 in monkey B). 0/141 neurons were selectively suppressed
by uncertainty. An example uncertainty-sensitive (U+) neuron’s CS responses are shown in
Figure 2.1C. Its activity increased following the presentation of the CS that predicted 0.25 ml of
juice reward with 50% chance until the uncertain outcome was delivered and the uncertainty was
resolved. This example neuron did not strongly respond to other CS objects or task events.
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Figure 2.1: (A) Experimental procedure for experiment 1. (B) Monkeys’ choice behavior in
experiment 1. Choice percentage of a single reward-probability CS (x-axis) versus all the other
reward probability CSs (red). Choice percentage of a single reward-amount CS (x-axis) versus
all the other reward-amount CSs (black). Data compiled from 5602 trials. (C) Responses of a
single uncertainty selective (U+) neuron in the internal capsule bordering region of the striatum
to the presentation of six fractal objects (shown above rasters) associated with certain and
uncertain predictions of juice reward. Dark blue raster plots indicate the activity in 50% CS trials
in which reward was omitted.
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All U+ neurons exhibited roughly similar responses (Figure 2.2A,B). On average, they
were strongly activated by the presentation of the CS that predicted 0.25 ml of juice reward with
50% chance. This activation was most often a ramp-like increase in activity, which continued
until the uncertain outcome was delivered and the uncertainty was resolved (Figure 2.2A).
Amongst single neurons, 44/45 U+ neurons responded more strongly to the CS object
associated with 50% chance of 0.25 ml of juice than to the CS object associated with 0.125 ml of
juice (Figure 2.2B) even though these CSs were associated with the same expected reward value.
Further neuron-by-neuron analyses revealed that amongst the task features of experiment
1, U+ neurons were consistently sensitive to reward uncertainty and to reward context (that is,
difference between trials in which reward was possible versus trials in which rewards would not
be delivered). This is shown in Figure 2.2C and in Supplementary Figure 2.2 for DS U+ neurons
in caudate and putamen, separately. Most single U+ neurons did not encode information about
expected values (defined as the difference between responses to objects associated with 0.25 and
0.125 ml of juice), spatial- and object-feature parameters (Figure 2.2C), or aversive outcomes
(Supplementary Figure 2.3). However, 24/45 U+ neurons discriminated reward-associated CSs
from CSs associated with no outcome delivery (Figure 2.2C, this reward-related enhancement
can also be observed in the average activity in Figure 2.2A). Also, on average, U+ neurons
responded to the delivery of expected/certain rewards with a weak but consistent phasic
excitation (Figure 2.2A; P<0.05; sign-rank test). The observations in Figure 2.2 indicate that
while U+ neurons were preferentially dedicated to signaling reward uncertainty, they were also
sensitive to reward context (or expectation) and reward delivery.
While U+ neurons did not encode the locations of CS objects, thus far, it was unknown if
they respond before or during saccades aimed at reward uncertain objects. To assess this further,
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we studied the dynamics of U+ uncertainty selectivity during choice trials. We found that, on
average, U+ uncertainty selectivity emerged after the monkeys fixated the object associated with
reward uncertainty (Supplementary Figure 2.4). Therefore, U+ neurons did not trigger saccades
aimed at reward-uncertain objects.
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Figure 2.2: (A) Average responses of 45 U+ neurons to different reward predictions in the
reward-probability and reward-amount procedure. Shaded region represents standard error. The
inset shows proportion of neurons (of 45 U+ neurons and of all 141 striatal neurons) displaying
uncertainty selectivity during the CS epoch in time. (B) CS responses of 45 U+ neurons for
different reward predictions in the reward-probability and reward-amount procedure (normalized
to the maximum CS response; from 0 to 1). In all, 44/45 neurons had the highest response for the
50% CS. (C) Sensitivity indices (Methods) for 45 striatal uncertainty-selective neurons for
different behavioral/task variables. Asterisk above the histogram indicates significant deviation
from 0 (P<0.01; sign-rank test). Significant individual neuron indices (P<0.01; Wilcoxon ranksum test) are grey. The number of significant indices is indicated near the histogram.
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Overall, the results of experiment 1 showed that the DS contains a subpopulation of
neurons with striking sensitivity to objects associated with reward uncertainty. However, several
important questions about these neurons remained unclear. First, are they sensitive to the level of
uncertainty in a graded manner?17,18 Second, do U+ neurons signal internal states related to the
expectation of reward or are their uncertainty responses dependent on external cues or objects?
Third, can U+ neurons support object learning under uncertainty? To answer these important
questions, we selectively recorded from U+ neurons in the DS in experiments 2–4.
2.3.2 DS neurons are sensitive to the level of reward uncertainty
To test if U+ neurons were sensitive to the level of reward uncertainty, in experiment 2,
we recorded 20 U+ neurons (14 in monkey B and 6 in monkey W) in a behavioral procedure in
which monkeys experienced a reward-probability block that contained five objects associated
with five probabilistic reward predictions (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% of 0.25 ml of juice), and a
reward-amount block that contained five objects associated with 100% reward predictions of
varying reward amounts (0.25, 0.1875, 0.125, 0.065 and 0 ml of juice).15,16 The expected values
of the five CSs in the probability block matched the expected values of the five CSs in the
amount block. Reward-uncertainty neurons in DS were identified during online screening as
neurons that responded to any of the uncertain conditioned stimuli (25, 50 or 75% reward). The
same preselection criteria were used in subsequent experiments in this study and in our previous
reports.17,18
An example U+ neuron’s responses to the 10 CS objects are shown in Figure 2.3A. It
responded most strongly to the presentation of the 50% CS object, and less strongly to the
presentation of the 25 and 75% CS objects. Moreover, it did not respond to the presentation of
objects associated with certain reward predictions (0 and 100% reward CS objects and CS
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objects in the reward-amount block). A similar result can be observed across the population of
U+ neurons (Figure 2.3B,C). U+ neurons’ average response was strongest for the presentation of
the 50% CS object. Their responses were weaker for 25 and 75% reward-associated CS objects.
On average, there was no significant difference between their responses to the 25% versus 75%
CS objects, which have the same level of uncertainty but different expected values. Furthermore,
as in experiment 1, during the reward-amount block, the neurons discriminated objects
associated with rewards from objects associated with no reward (Figure 2.3C, black trace). In
sum, experiment 2 showed that U+ neurons were sensitive to the levels of reward uncertainty.
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Figure 2.3: (A) Responses of a single uncertainty selective (U+) neuron to the presentation of 10
fractal objects associated with certain and uncertain predictions of juice reward. (B) Average
responses of 20 U+ neurons in the reward-probability block (left) and reward amount block
(right). (C) Average normalized responses of 20 U+ neurons for probability (red) and amount
(black) CSs. Asterisks indicate differences between CSs (**P<0.01; *P<0.025; paired sign-rank
test). The inset shows the single neuron’s CS responses for different reward predictions in the
reward-probability block (normalized to the maximum CS response; from 0 to 1). Numbers
above the inset indicate the number of cells that exhibited the greatest response for 25, 50 or 75%
CSs; 60% of the neurons exhibited greatest response for 50% reward CS.
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2.3.3 U+ neurons are found most often in internal capsule-bordering regions of DS and are
likely medium spiny neurons
The location of all recorded U+ neurons is shown in Figure 2.4A. U+ neurons were most
often found within the anterior–dorsal putamen and caudate nucleus regions that bordered the
internal capsule (Figure 2.4A, Supplementary Figures 2.1-2.2), prominently in the anterior
putamen. In addition to reconstructing neuron location by recording sites and depths, we further
verified their location using structural MRI. Following the successful recording of a U+ neuron,
the electrode was temporarily fixed at the recording site and its tip’s location in the target area
was imaged (Figure 2.4B). We refer to this brain area as the icbDS. The low baseline discharge
rate of U+ neurons (mostly <1 spikes per s; Figure 2.4C) suggests that they are medium spiny
neurons70,74,77,173,174—the chief output neurons of the striatum.
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Figure 2.4: (A) Estimated locations of 45 U+ neurons (red dots) in the internal capsule bordering
striatum shown on two coronal slices. Ranges of the neurons on each slice and the distance of
each slice from the center of the anterior commissure (AC) are indicated. Black dots indicate
other recorded neurons. Insert is the histogram of recording locations along the anterior-posterior
axis. (B) A coronal T1 magnetic resonance (MR) image taken with a tungsten electrode at the
location of an identified U+ neuron. (C) Histogram of baseline firing rates of recorded neurons.
Inset shows spike duration (trough-to-trough) for all U+ neurons (left), non-uncertainty-selective
putative medium spiny neurons (neurons with a baseline firing rate of < 3 spikes/second), and
non-uncertainty-selective putative cholinergic interneurons (CHAT) neurons (neurons with a
baseline firing rate >= 3 spikes/second). Error bars indicate standard errors. Single neuron data
points are shown as scatters. Asterisks indicate significant differences (Wilcoxian rank sum test;
p < 0.05).
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2.3.4 icbDS uncertainty responses are object-dependent
The results of experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with two possible scenarios. First, U+
responses may signal internal states related to reward expectation, particularly with the
expectation of uncertain rewards. A second scenario is that U+ responses may signal the
uncertainty of the object–reward associations, rather than the internal state associated with
reward uncertainty. To distinguish between these alternatives, monkeys were presented with four
CSs (experiment 3). Two distinct CSs were associated with 100 and 50% chances of reward and
were kept on the experimental presentation screen for 2.5 s, until the time of the trial outcome
(same trial structure as in Figure 2.1A). Two other CSs were also associated with 100 and 50%
chances of reward and were present on the screen for 1 s and outcomes were delivered in 1.5 s
after the removal of the CSs (the 1.5 s period during which the CS is not present is referred to as
a trace period). Therefore, for all CSs, reward was delivered 2.5 s after CS onset. Monkey
performance indicated that they understood the procedure and were similarly motivated by trace
and no-trace 50% reward predictions (Supplementary Figure 2.5).
We identified U+ neurons in icbDS and recorded their activity in this paradigm (n=32
neurons; 11 in monkey W and 21 in monkey B). An example U+ neuron is shown in Figure
2.5A. This neuron robustly discriminated 50% reward-associated CS object (uncertain condition)
from the 100% reward-associated CS object (P<0.01; rank-sum test). Surprisingly, the removal
of the uncertain CS (trace condition) before the outcome was delivered completely abolished its
uncertainty selectivity (Figure 2.5A, green and blue traces). Similar results were found for most
of the U+ neurons (Figure 2.5B). The discriminability of striatal uncertainty signals was greatly
diminished when the uncertain object was not present at the time of the outcome (Figure 2.5C).
Many U+ neurons’ uncertainty signals were completely abolished (Figure 2.5B,C). These results
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indicate that U+ neurons’ reward-uncertainty responses are related to the presence of the
uncertain object.
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Figure 2.5: (A) Responses of a single U+ neuron to 100 and 50% reward predictions without a
trace period (CS objects remained until the outcome) (black and red), and with a trace period (CS
objects disappeared after 1 s) (green and blue). (B) In all, 22/32 neurons displayed significant
differences in reward-uncertainty responses across the no-trace and trace conditions (red; ranksum test; P<0.01; 26/32 were significant with a 0.05 threshold). All significant changes were
reductions of uncertainty responses. Normalization was performed by subtracting 100% CS
responses from 50% CS responses (for trace and no-trace conditions, separately). (C) Single
neuron (insets above) and population reward-uncertainty discriminability was greatly diminished
in the trace condition. AUC, area under receiver-operating characteristic curve.
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In the basal forebrain (particularly in its medial regions), some neurons also signal reward
uncertainty with ramp-like responses17, however, additional experiments revealed that their
uncertainty-selective signals persist during the same trace-conditioning procedure used to study
U+ neurons (Supplementary Figure 2.5). Consistent with this observation, other reward-related
signals are preserved during trace conditioning in brain regions that are interconnected with the
basal forebrain, such as in the dorsal raphe175 and in the amygdala.176 These observations suggest
that basal forebrain and related limbic structures signal values and uncertainty of internal states
(perhaps somewhat independently of the external environment), whereas the U+ neurons in the
basal ganglia signals are related to the presence of cues associated with reward uncertainty.
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Figure 2.6: (A) Single neuron’s responses (shown as single trial rasters) to the presentation of
three novel objects shown in the order of the monkey’s experience (bottom to top). (B) Binned
neuronal population response across learning (30 learning sessions, 30 neurons) shown
separately for 100, 50 and 0% reward-associated novel objects. Asterisks indicate significant
variance across the three conditions (P<0.01; Kruskal–Wallis test). Neuronal responses are
shown separately for Pavlovian and choice trials in Supplementary Figure 2.6. (C) Monkeys’
choices during learning. Proportion of choices of the higher-valued fractal CS objects during
randomly interleaved choice trials (binned like neuronal activity in B). **P<0.01, *P<0.05 (signrank test assessing difference between bins).
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2.3.5 icbDS uncertainty responses are rapidly shaped by learning
The previous data prompted us to assess how U+ neuronal responses are shaped by the
learning of novel object–reward associations (experiment 4). Thus far, we had tested the
responses of U+ neurons to reward uncertainty arising from knowledge about reward variability
associated with 50% reward CSs (also called known-uncertainty or risk). However, if uncertain
object–reward signals in the DS contribute to object learning, then U+ neurons should also signal
uncertainty that is due to a lack of previous object–outcome associations (also called ambiguity)an uncertainty that can be identified and resolved by learning. To test this, we recorded the
activity of identified U+ neurons in a Pavlovian procedure in which three novel fractals were
used as CSs associated with 100, 50 and 0% reward probabilities (n=30 neurons; 11 in monkey
W and 19 in monkey B). One example U+ neuron is shown in Figure 2.6A. At the start of
learning, this neuron showed a strong increase in response to all the novel CSs. As the CSs were
repeatedly experienced, the neuronal activity started to decrease for certain CSs (0 and 100%)
and remained roughly the same for the reward-uncertain CS (50% reward prediction). The
population of 30 U+ neurons shows a similar pattern (Figure 2.6B and Supplementary Figure
2.6). The neuronal responses to certain object–reward associations decreased as the monkeys
learned (Figure 2.6C). These results demonstrated that U+ neurons signal object–reward
uncertainty of unknown or novel objects and that the DS uncertainty responses can be rapidly
shaped by learning, even within a single experimental session.

2.4

Discussion
In the caudate–putamen complex we found a population of neurons that signal

uncertainty of object–reward associations. These U+ neurons were often found in the icbDS.
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Their uncertainty-selective responses depended on the presence of objects associated with
reward uncertainty and evolved rapidly as monkeys learned novel object–reward associations.
Which brain regions supply reward uncertainty signals to U+ neurons? Their average location in
the striatum may provide a clue. U+ neurons were most often found within the anterior putamen
and caudate regions that bordered the internal capsule, prominently in the anterior putamen.
icbDS receives inhibitory inputs from the ventral pallidum177, where some neurons are inhibited
by reward uncertainty (Supplementary Figure 2.7).16 Given the uncertainty-excitatory responses
of many icbDS neurons (Figure 2.2), we hypothesize that the inhibition of pallidal neurons by
uncertainty may open a gate, so that U+ neurons can selectively respond to cortical inputs
carrying sensory information about objects90,108 and about their reward value or uncertainty.20
Although precisely which cortical regions send uncertainty and other signals to U+ neurons
remains to be assessed, recent work has demonstrated the presence of reward-uncertainty
responsive cells within regions of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).15 Notably, areas of DS that
overlap with where we report these U+ neurons receive excitatory inputs from this region of
ACC.48,49,50(p) The differences in response to uncertainty of ACC and icbDS, however, have yet
to be assessed.
The task responses of striatal U+ neurons differentiated them from reward uncertaintyselective neurons in the anterodorsal septum and the medial basal forebrain. For example, during
object learning, anterodorsal septal uncertainty-selective neurons responded preferentially to
knowledge-based uncertainty (often called risk), after monkeys learned the uncertain stimulus–
response association.18 In contrast, during a similar object-learning task, U+ neurons responded
strongly to novel stimuli, whose conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus relationship was
not yet learned (Figure 2.6). Unlike U+ neurons, medial basal forebrain reward uncertainty36

sensitive neurons slowly learned to discriminate between certain and uncertain reward-predicting
objects.17 This slow learning was not correlated with the fast time course of the monkeys’
object–reward associative learning. 17 These data are consistent with the observation that there
are no known connections from the medial basal forebrain or septum to the striatum and suggest
that U+ neurons belong to a mostly distinct system for signaling uncertainty of objects that may
be particularly well suited to contribute to object learning.
It is noteworthy that U+ neurons did not encode all types of uncertainty, or only
uncertainty.3,18 First, they did not respond to uncertainty about punishments. Second, on average,
they discriminated reward-associated CSs from reward-unassociated CSs (Figure 2.2A,C). In
fact, similar reward-related tonic activity shifts were observed in other neurons that encode
reward uncertainty.15,16 It remains to be tested whether they are due to context value (or
relevance), or if they are due to uncertainty that could exist even during the expectation of
‘certain’ rewards (for example, due to errors in the estimation of reward timing). Third, U+
neurons’ uncertainty responses were abolished by the removal of the CS before the trial outcome
(during trace conditioning). This suggests that striatal U+ neurons’ responses depended on the
presence of the uncertain CS object. This finding further differentiated striatal U+ neurons from
uncertainty-enhanced neurons in the medial basal forebrain whose uncertainty selectivity
persisted when the CS object was removed before the trial outcome (Supplementary Figure 2.5).
Our study in monkeys and a previous human brain-imaging study10 suggest that icbDS is
a prominent node for processing information about reward uncertainty. However, it is possible
that there are other striatal mechanisms for signaling uncertainty, and/or for integrating
uncertainty with stimulus-feature information, movement kinematics and values.178,179 Indeed,
different areas of the primate striatum learn and signal values in distinct manners73,76,78,79,106,178–
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181

to support their different roles in action, decision-making, and learning and

memory.48,49,73,76,77,79,90,106,178,179,182 How uncertainty guides computations across different striatal
subregions must therefore be an important direction of future studies. Objects in the environment
are important because they signal rewards or dangers, or because they represent an opportunity
to learn and change one’s state. In this study, we showed that the basal ganglia signals reward
uncertainty of object–reward associations—a critical variable for monitoring and learning from
objects. These results demonstrate a novel role for internal-capsule bordering putamen and
caudate in controlling behaviors in uncertain contexts.

2.5

Supplementary material
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Supplementary Figure 2.1: Supplementary information about the location of U+ neurons
(A) Estimated locations of U+ neurons (red dots) in the internal capsule bordering striatum
shown on two coronal slices for each monkey. Formatting, anterior-posterior ranges of the
neurons on each slice, and the distance of each slice from the center of the anterior commissure
(AC) are as in Figure 2.4. (B) Three dimensional scatters of neuronal locations relative to the
center-top of the AC. Red dots – U+, Black dots – other recorded striatal neurons, small black
dots – neurons that were encountered (but not recorded) during experiments to map the extent of
the caudate and putamen and to verify locations of the internal capsule and AC. Inset – locations
of recorded neurons from two monkeys shown in two planes (medial-lateral versus dorsalventral) relative to the center-top of the AC. 95% confidence ellipse (red) around the U+ neurons
includes 44 U+ neurons and 65 other recorded striatal neurons; 13 of those 65 neurons displayed
significant correlations with the expected reward values of the CSs (correlations were assessed as
relationship between the size of expected rewards in the reward amount block and neuronal
activity during the CS epoch; Spearman’s rank correlations; p<0.05; tested using a permutation
test; 10,000 shuffles). (C) U+ neurons shown for two monkeys separately (magenta and blue)
relative to the center-top of the AC. Each plot compares two different anatomical planes. 95%
confidence ellipses of the two monkeys in all planes were highly overlapped.
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Supplementary Figure 2.2: Sensitivity indices comparing U+ neurons in the putamen versus
caudate nucleus. Sensitivity indices (same as in Figure 2.2) are shown separately for putamen
and caudate U+ neurons. There were no significant differences between neuronal task-responses
amongst populations of putamen and caudate U+ neurons (ns; Wilcoxon rank sum test).
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Supplementary Figure 2.3: U+ neurons’ responses in the Appetitive-Aversive procedure. For
each neuron (indicated by a circle; n=15; Monkey B), we plotted the differences in response
magnitude between 50% reward CS and 100% reward CS (x-axis) and between 50% CS and 0%
reward CS responses (y-axis). The responses in the appetitive and aversive blocks are shown
separately (left and right). Filled circles indicate neurons that displayed significant variability
across the 3 reward (left) or punishment (right) predicting CSs (Kruskal-Wallis test; p<0.01)
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Supplementary Figure 2.4: U+ neurons’ responses during choice. (A) Choice-trial structure (left)
and the monkeys’ choice behavior (right). Monkeys made a choice between two CSs among the
six well-learned CSs (three indicating reward amounts, and three indicating reward
probabilities). The inset shows the proportion of trials the monkeys chose 0, 0.125, 50% 0.25,
and 0.25 CSs over all other CSs. (B) Average normalized neuronal responses of U+ neurons
during choice trials sorted by the monkeys’ choices. Specifically, neuronal activity was sorted
into trials in which the monkey chose the object associated with 0.25 ml of juice, (black), the
object associated with 50% of 0.25 ml of juice (red), or 0.125 ml of juice (blue). Asterisks above
task epochs indicate statistical differences amongst the 3 trial types (first Kruskal Wallis test
p<0.01 across three trial types, then Wilcoxon rank sum tests; p<0.01; inset shows the meanings
of asterisk color). Normalization was done by subtracting the average activity during trial start
fixation epoch.
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Supplementary Figure 2.5: Trace conditioning: behavior and comparison of striatum and basal
forebrain U+ neurons’ responses (A) Licking behavior of two monkeys during trace conditioning
(measured from CS presentation to outcome). The licking behavior during 50% reward trace and
non-trace trials was not significantly different (p>0.05). Asterisks indicate significant differences
(p<0.05; Wilcoxon rank sum test). Error bars denote standard error. (B) Comparison between
ramping uncertainty selective neurons in the icbDS and the medial basal forebrain (BF). Average
normalized responses of icbDS U+ neurons (left; n = 32) and BF uncertainty selective neurons
(right; n=17) during trace and no-trace conditions. Responses are shown for 100% (black) and
50% (red) CSs separately. Asterisk denotes significant change (sign rank test; p<0.05). (C)
Uncertainty response % change (trace versus no-trace) for icbDS and BF. Asterisk denotes
significant difference (Wilcoxon rank sum test; p<0.05).
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Supplementary Figure 2.6: U+ neurons’ responses during learning for Pavlovian and choice
trials. Binned neuronal population response across learning (30 learning sessions) shown
separately for 100, 50, and 0% reward associated novel objects. Asterisks indicate significant
variance across the three conditions (p<0.05; Kruskal-Wallis test).
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Supplementary Figure 2.7: The ventral pallidum as one source of uncertainty signals in the
striatum. The ventral pallidal regions are known to send inhibitory projections to icbDS. These
regions contain uncertainty-suppressed neurons (Ledbetter, Chen, Monosov, 2016; Journal of
Neuroscience). Here, we present a schematic of a hypothetical gating of icbDS by pallidal inputs.
When the pallidum is inhibited by uncertainty, cortical inputs can further shape and drive the
icbDS response. We recorded the activity of 23 uncertainty-sensitive neurons in the ventral
pallidum while two monkeys (B and W) experienced familiar/over-trained CSs associated with
0, 25, 50, 75, and 100 % chance of reward delivery (same as in Experiment 2). 18 neurons were
suppressed by uncertainty, 5 were enhanced. Consistent with the proposed circuit, we found that
the average CS responses of the 18 VP uncertainty-suppressed neurons (blue) form
approximately an inverted mirror image of the response function of icbDS U+ neurons (shown in
yellow). ** - p < 0.01 (sign rank test); * - p<0.025 (sign rank test).
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Chapter 3: A primate neural network that controls
information seeking
Adapted from:
J. Kael White*, Ethan S. Bromberg-Martin*, Kaining Zhang, Julia Pai, Sarah H. Heilbronner,
Suzanne N. Haber, Ilya E. Monosov. A neural network for information seeking. (in review)
*denotes shared first authorship and equal contribution to the manuscript

Humans and other animals often express a strong desire to know the uncertain rewards
their future has in store, even when there is no way to use this information to influence the
outcome.23,26,28,29,31,171,183 However, while much is known about how the brain predicts rewards
after information has been received184, it is unknown how the brain predicts information itself,
and how such neural predictions motivate information seeking behavior. Here we show that
neurons in a network of interconnected subregions of the primate anterior cingulate cortex and
basal ganglia predict the moment of gaining information about uncertain future rewards. We
demonstrate that animals preferentially direct their gaze at objects that resolve uncertainty and
that pharmacological disruptions of this network reduce the motivation to seek information.
These findings demonstrate a novel cortico-basal ganglia mechanism responsible for motivating
actions to resolve uncertain situations by seeking knowledge about the future.

3.1

Introduction
Stimuli do not often predict outcomes with absolute certainty. As such, humans and

nonhuman animals have evolved complex nervous systems which can make predictions about
future outcomes and adjust behaviors to seek information that can resolve uncertainty about
these predictions. By seeking information that reduces uncertainty about the future, animals can
maximize the value of interacting with environmental objects. Therefore, a mechanism for
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signaling when uncertainty surrounding an outcome will be resolved and for directing behavior
towards seeking information that reduces uncertainty could be useful in complex environments.
Information-seeking behavior has been demonstrated in a range of species. Interestingly,
findings in both humans185 and nonhuman primates26–28 demonstrated that the brain screens for
opportunities to resolve uncertainty by obtaining information. Further, these representations are
present in areas of the brain implicated in reinforcement learning and motivational control26,27
and signals in these areas produce information prediction errors26 much like the reward
prediction errors which in-part guide reward-seeking behaviors.34,186–188 Interestingly, advance
information about the delivery of future reward is valued enough that humans31 and nonhuman
animals28 will sacrifice levels of this reward in order to obtain this information. Despite its
importance to survival and its value to human and nonhuman subjects alike, little is known about
how and where in the brain information is valued and where information-seeking behaviors are
promoted.
Insight into how this may be accomplished comes from research investigating how the
brain promotes reward-seeking behaviors. The brain has populations of neurons which encode
RPEs35,37 and help guide behaviors towards primary rewards.32,36,189 The activity of these cells is
sustained from when the reward is first predicted and ramps to the expected time of reward
delivery.184 In many cases, these reward prediction signals were directly linked to online rewardseeking behavior; the strength of these signals are correlated to reward-seeking behaviors77,190–192
and disrupting the signals alters reward seeking.193,194
But what are the requirements for a neural network to motivate behavior towards
information-seeking behavior? It must (A) monitor the level of uncertainty about future events,
(B) anticipate the time when information will become available to resolve the uncertainty, and
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(C) causally motivate behavior to obtain information. Here we demonstrate that these criteria are
met by an anatomically interconnected network comprising three areas of the primate brain:
ACC and two subregions of the basal ganglia (BG), the internal-capsule-bordering portion of the
dorsal striatum (icbDS) and the anterior pallidum including anterior globus pallidus and the
pallidum (Pal).

3.2

Materials and methods

3.2.1 General procedures
Four adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for behavioral, recording,
and inactivation experiments (Animals B, R, Z, and W). All procedures conformed to the Guide
for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by the Washington University
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. A plastic head holder and plastic recording
chamber were fixed to the skull under general anesthesia and sterile surgical conditions. The
chambers were tilted laterally by 35-40° and aimed at the anterior cingulate and the anterior
regions of the basal ganglia. After the animals recovered from surgery, they participated in the
experiments.
3.2.2 Data acquisition
While the animals participated in the behavioral tasks we recorded single neurons in the
anterior cingulate cortex, internal capsule-bordering regions of the dorsal striatum, and anterior
pallidum including the ventral pallidum and the anterior-most part of the globus pallidus internal
segment. Electrode trajectories were determined with 1 mm-spacing grid system and with the aid
of MR images (3T) obtained along the direction of the recording chamber. This MRI-based
estimation of neuron recording locations was aided by custom-built software (PyElectrode195). In
addition, in order to further verify the location of recording sites, after a subset of experiments
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the electrode was temporarily fixed in place at the recording site and the electrode tip’s location
in the target area was verified by MRI (Figure 3.1).
Single-unit recording was performed using glass-coated electrodes (Alpha Omega). The
electrode was inserted through a stainless-steel guide tube and advanced by an oil-driven
micromanipulator (MO-97A, Narishige). Signal acquisition (including amplification and
filtering) was performed using Alpha Omega 44 kHz SNR system. Action potential waveforms
were identified online by multiple time-amplitude windows with an additional template matching
algorithm (Alpha-Omega). Neuronal recording was restricted to single neurons that were isolated
online. Neuronal and behavioral analyses were conducted offline in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick,
MA).
Eye position was obtained with an infrared video camera (Eyelink, SR Research).
Behavioral events and visual stimuli were controlled by Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions. Juice, used as reward, was delivered with a solenoid delivery
reward system (CRIST Instruments). Juice-related licking was measured and quantified using
previously described methods.15
3.2.3 Behavioral tasks
We analyzed data recorded from several behavioral tasks which can be grouped into three
major categories: standard uncertainty tasks, information viewing task (used for recording), and
information seeking task (used for inactivations).
3.2.3.1 Standard uncertainty tasks
These tasks are described in detail in previous work.15,18 They each used a distinct set of
fractal visual CSs with different associated outcomes. However, they all shared the following
general outline. Animals were presented with a small white circular trial start cue at the center of
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the screen. In some tasks animals were required to fixate the trial start cue for a fixed duration
(typically 0.5-1 s) for the trial to continue; if they failed to fulfill this requirement within a grace
period (typically 5 s) the trial would be considered an error, they would receive a timeout, and
the trial would repeat. In other tasks animal were not required to fixate the trial start cue; it was
simply shown for a fixed duration (typically 1 s). After the trial start period, the trial start cue
disappeared and a fractal visual conditioned stimulus (CS) appeared on the screen for a fixed
duration (2.5 s). The CS was randomly positioned at one of three locations: the center of the
screen, the left side of the screen, or the right side of the screen (at 10 or 12.5 degrees
eccentricity). In some sessions only the left and right locations were used. Animals were not
required to gaze at or interact with the CS in any way. At the end of the CS period, the CS
disappeared and simultaneously the trial’s outcome was delivered. Finally, there was an intertrial interval during which the screen was blank (typically randomized between 1-8 s, with
different durations for different animals and tasks). In some sessions, a small fraction of intertrial intervals included the unexpected presentation of different salient events, which could be
appetitive (juice), aversive (an airpuff, ~35 psi, delivered through a narrow tube placed ~6-8 cm
from the face15), or audiovisual (an auditory tone sounding and the screen flashing white).
The standard uncertainty tasks primarily differed in their CSs, outcomes, and block structure:
-

Task A15: Trials were presented in two distinct blocks. In the Probability block, there
were five CSs associated with 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100% probabilities of 0.25 mL juice. In
the Amount block, there were five CSs associated with 100% probability of 0, 0.0625,
0.125, 0.1875, and 0.25 mL juice. Hence for each CS in the Probability block there was a
matched CS in the Amount block that was associated with an identical mean amount of
juice, but for which the outcome was certain rather than probabilistic. Each block
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consisted of 20 trials (4 presentations of each of its 5 CSs, shuffled in a randomized
order). The two blocks were presented repeatedly in an alternating manner, with each
block continuing until its 20 trials were correctly completed and then immediately
transitioning into the other block.
-

Task B16: Same as task A, except it used three Probability CSs (0, 50, 100%) and the
three corresponding Amount CSs (0, 0.125, 0.25 mL), and each block consisted of 6 or 9
trials (2 or 3 presentations of each of its 3 CSs). In some sessions, blocks also included
interleaved choice trials in which two CSs were presented and animals were allowed to
choose between them with a saccade; our analysis here is of non-choice trials.

-

Task C15: Trials were presented in two distinct blocks. In the Appetitive block, there were
three CSs associated with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities of 0.4 mL juice. In the Aversive
block, there were three CSs associated with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities of airpuffs.
Each block consisted of 12 trials (4 presentations of each of its 3 CSs).

-

Task D15: There were 9 CSs. Four CSs were associated with 25, 50, 75, and 100%
probabilities of 0.4 mL juice. Four other CSs were associated with 25, 50, 75, and 100%
probabilities of airpuff. One final CS was associated with no outcome (i.e. 0% probability
of both reward and airpuff). The CSs were presented in a pseudorandom order.

-

Task E: Three CSs were associated with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities of 0.25 mL juice.
The CSs were presented in a pseudorandom order.

3.2.3.2 Information viewing task
This task began with the appearance of a small circular trial start cue at the center of the
screen which animals were required to fixate for a fixed duration (typically 0.5 or 1 s). The trial
start cue then disappeared and was followed in succession by a CS that was displayed for a fixed
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duration (typically 1 s), which was then replaced by a cue at the same location that was displayed
for a fixed duration (typically 2 s). The cue then disappeared, and simultaneously the outcome
was delivered. The trial then completed with a 1 s inter-trial interval. The CSs were presented
randomly on either the left or right side of the screen (10 degrees eccentricity). There were three
Info CSs that yielded juice reward (0.25 mL) with 0, 50, and 100% probabilities, and were
followed by one of two informative cues whose color indicated the trial’s outcome (Figure
3.3A). There were three analogous Noinfo CSs that also yielded juice reward with 0, 50, and
100% probabilities, but which were followed by one of two non-informative cues whose colors
were randomized on each trial and hence did not convey any information about the trial’s
outcome (Figure 3.3A). In some sessions Noinfo CSs were followed by a single non-informative
visual cue. There was no apparent difference in behavior or neural activity between sessions with
one or two non-informative cues; hence their data was pooled. The 6 total CSs were presented in
a pseudo-random order.
3.2.3.3 Information seeking task
This task also began with animals fixating a trial start cue for a fixed duration, followed by a
CS presented randomly on either the left or right side of the screen. However, the trial start cue
remained visible for a fixed duration after CS onset during which animals were required to
maintain fixation on the trial start cue (typically for 1 s in animal B, 0.25 s in animal R, and 0.5
or 1 s in animal Z). Fixation breaks were treated as errors: the screen went blank, there was a 1-2
s penalty delay period, and then the trial repeated from the beginning. After the fixation period,
the trial start cue disappeared, and animals were free to move their eyes. The task then detected
the first moment when animals gazed at the CS, defined as the eye position entering a square
window centered on the CS (i.e. when horizontal and vertical eye positions were within 4° of the
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center of the CS). If animals gazed at an Info CS it was immediately replaced with the
appropriate informative cue; if they gazed at a Noinfo CS it was immediately replaced with a
non-informative cue; if they did not gaze at a CS, no cue was shown. Importantly, regardless of
their gaze behavior, all stimuli disappeared and the outcome was delivered at the same, fixed
time after CS onset on all trials in the session (typically 3 s). Thus, gazing at the CS gave animals
access to the cues but did not give them earlier access to the juice reward. In the version of the
information seeking task used for inactivation experiments and controls, there were only two CSs
– an Info CS and a Noinfo CS – that were both associated with 50% probability of 0.25 mL juice
reward. By ensuring that the probability, amount, and timing of juice reward were identical for
all CSs on all trials, we minimized the possibility that gaze behavior to the CSs could be
influenced by different reward expectations or reward prediction errors induced by CS onset.
In some sessions, neurons recorded using the information viewing task were also recorded in
interleaved trials or in separate blocks with a version of the information seeking task. These
information seeking trials were indicated to the animal by a distinct green color of the trial start
cue (Figure 3.7A). These trials also used six CSs: Info and Noinfo CSs associated with 0, 50, and
100% reward probability. These six fractal CSs on information seeking trials were visually
identical to the analogous six fractal CSs used for information viewing trials. Information-related
neural responses in these information seeking trials were typically similar to activity in
information viewing trials (e.g. activity ramping up to the time the informative cue would
become available and to the time a non-informed outcome would be delivered). Note, however,
that the task design of information seeking trials induced a link between gaze and receipt of
information: gaze behavior was not completely ‘free’ because it was required if the animal
wanted to produce the cue, and the cue appeared with variable timing depending on the animal’s
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behavior. Therefore, to be conservative, data from the information seeking trials was only
included in our analysis of information signals (Figure 3.4) in a small number of neurons for
which no data from information viewing trials was available (n=4 ACC neurons in monkey Z).
Analysis of neural activity in Figure 3.2 and Supplementary Figures 3.1-3.2 uses data from
all neurons recorded using standard uncertainty tasks in which CSs were associated with all five
reward probabilities (tasks A and D). Analysis of neural activity during information tasks (Figure
3.4) uses data from neurons recorded using an information task.
3.2.4 Muscimol injections
On muscimol injection sessions, a 33-gauge cannula was inserted through a 23-gauge
guide tube into a grid hole and to a depth previously identified to be in icbDS or Pal and to
contain information-related neurons (Supplementary Figure 3.3). The other end of the cannula
was connected to a 10 µL Hamilton syringe. Behavioral data from the information seeking task
were collected in blocks of 70-150 correct trials. Before the injection we collected a ‘preinjection’ behavioral data set from the animal performing the information seeking task, typically
for one block (median: 96 correct trials, standard deviation: 24, range: 48-164). After recording
the baseline data, we used a manual syringe pump (Stoelting) or automated syringe pump
(Harvard Apparatus) to inject muscimol dissolved in saline. Muscimol concentrations were 8
mg/mL, injection rates were typically 0.1 µL/min (range: 0.09-0.2), and injection volumes
ranged from 1.0-2.5 µL in icbDS and 0.545-1.4 µL in Pal. After each injection we collected a
‘post-injection’ behavioral data set (median: 303 correct trials, standard deviation: 157, range:
43-839). All pre- and post-injection blocks of data were included in our analysis regardless of the
animal’s response times or other gaze behavior, as long as the animal remained engaged in the
task (i.e. generally initiating trials quickly and performing them correctly). On two sessions pre54

injection data from the same day was not available, so we used the first block of behavioral data
collected from the same animal on days immediately before or after the session to obtain a
comparable baseline. On saline injection control sessions, the same procedure was followed
except that only the saline vehicle was injected (with the same volumes previously used for
muscimol injections). On sham control sessions, the same procedure was followed (including
pauses in procedure to simulate setting up the cannula, advancing the cannula, performing the
injection, etc.), except no cannula was inserted and no injection was given.
3.2.5 Data analysis
Neurons recorded in the standard uncertainty tasks were included in our dataset if they
showed significant responsiveness to uncertainty (activity on uncertain reward CS trials
significantly different from both 0% reward CS trials and 100% reward CS trials, rank-sum tests,
both p < 0.05 and both differences with the same sign). For this purpose, activity was measured
in a broad time window encompassing the CS period to avoid making any assumptions about the
time course of neural responses (0.1-2.5 s after CS onset). The neuron’s sign of uncertainty
coding was defined as +1 if its ROC area for discriminating between uncertain reward CS trials
vs pooled data from 0% and 100% reward CS trials was > 0.5, and defined as -1 if its ROC area
was < 0.5. Similarly, to avoid making any assumptions about the nature or time course of
information-related signals, all neurons recorded in the information tasks were included in our
dataset if they were classified online as potentially uncertainty responsive based on their activity
on Noinfo trials or during any other uncertainty-related task. The neuron’s sign of uncertainty
coding was defined in the same manner as in standard uncertainty tasks, using activity from
Noinfo trials in a 0.5 s window before outcome onset.
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Neural activity was converted to normalized activity as follows. Each neuron’s spiking
activity was smoothed with a causal exponential kernel (mean = 30 ms) and then z-scored and
sign-normalized using the following procedure. The neuron’s average activity timecourse
aligned at CS onset was calculated for each condition (defined here as each combination of CS
and cue). These average activity timecourses from the different conditions were all concatenated
into a single vector, and its mean and standard deviation were calculated. Henceforth, all future
analyses converted that neuron’s firing rates to normalized activity by (1) subtracting the mean
of that vector, (2) dividing by the standard deviation of that vector, (3) multiplying by the
neuron’s sign of uncertainty coding. Thus, normalized activity of +1 in a given task condition
means that the neuron’s firing rate deviated away from its average firing rate in the same
direction that it responded to uncertainty, by an amount equivalent to 1 SD of its overall
distribution of average firing rates during the task.
Neural uncertainty signals were calculated in specific time windows (e.g. pre-cue, preoutcome, etc.) as the ROC area for distinguishing activity on uncertain reward CS trials (25, 50,
and 75%) from pooled data from 0% and 100% certain reward trials. In the information viewing
task uncertainty signals were calculated separately for Info and Noinfo trials. To visualize their
timecourses, they were calculated on neural activity at millisecond resolution after activity was
smoothed with a gaussian kernel (SD = 50 ms) and sign-normalized based on the neuron’s sign
of uncertainty coding on Noinfo trials in a 0.5 s pre-outcome window (Figure 3.4). The Info Cue
Anticipation Index was defined as the difference between its uncertainty signal for Info and
Noinfo trials in a 0.5 s pre-cue time window. Hence the index was positive if a neuron had a
higher uncertainty signal in anticipation of Info CSs, and negative if a neuron had a higher
uncertainty signal in anticipation of Noinfo CSs. The Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index was
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defined as the difference between its uncertainty signals computed on two different time
windows on Noinfo trials: a 0.5 s pre-outcome window, and a 0.5 s post-cue window (0.15-0.65
s after cue onset). Hence the index was positive if a neuron’s uncertainty signal grew more
positive between the cue and outcome, and negative if it grew more negative between the cue
and outcome. Neurons were classified as information-responsive if their Info Cue Anticipation
Index was significantly different from 0 (p < 0.05, permutation tests conducted by comparing the
index calculated on the true data to the distribution of indexes calculated on 20000 permuted
datasets that shuffled the assignment of trials to Info and Noinfo conditions). Neurons were
classified as having a significant Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index using the analogous
permutation test (p < 0.05, shuffling the assignment of data to the post-cue and pre-outcome time
windows). For analysis of information-oriented gaze behavior, the same two indexes were
calculated for each neuron except that instead of using neural data they used the behavioral gaze
data (equal to 1 for milliseconds when the animal’s gaze was classified as being in the stimulus
window and 0 otherwise). Finally, to plot the timecourse of uncertainty signals from the
population including neurons with different signs of uncertainty coding, the normalized
uncertainty signal (Figure 3.4F) was defined as the ‘absolute’ ROC area, i.e. as 0.5 +
|Uncertainty signal – 0.5|. Thus if the uncertainty signal was excitatory (> 0.5) it was left intact,
while it was flipped to become > 0.5 if it was inhibitory (< 0.5).
Latency of uncertainty coding. Each neuron’s smoothed normalized activity aligned at CS
onset was further smoothed with a 101 ms causal boxcar kernel and then tested at each
millisecond after CS onset for whether it met the following criteria: (1) highly significant ROC
area for distinguishing pooled data from uncertain reward CSs from the certain 0% reward CS (p
< 0.005), (2) highly significant ROC area for distinguishing pooled data from uncertain reward
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CSs from the certain 100% reward CS (p < 0.005); (3) both ROC areas have the same ‘sign’ (i.e.
both > 0.5 indicating activation by uncertainty or < 0.5 indicating inhibition by uncertainty). A
neuron’s uncertainty coding latency was defined as the first millisecond after which it met these
criteria for at least 24 consecutive milliseconds. See Supplementary Figure 3.1 for the latencies
and full ROC timecourses in all neurons with detected latencies. This method was chosen to
produce latencies that resemble those seen in raw traces of neural activity, but the same key
result (i.e. Pal having shorter latency than ACC and icbDS) was found with other latency
detection methods (e.g. different smoothing methods, significance criteria, required number of
consecutive time bins,etc). Each area’s latency was defined as the 1st percentile of its distribution
of single neuron latencies, and areas were compared by testing whether the difference between
their latencies was significantly different from that expected by chance (p < 0.05, permutation
test, conducted by comparing the latency difference calculated on the true data to the distribution
of latency differences calculated on 20000 permuted datasets that shuffled the assignment of
neurons between the two areas being compared).
Rough vs graded uncertainty coding. In standard uncertainty tasks, a neuron’s rough
uncertainty activity was calculated as the difference in normalized activity between pooled data
from all uncertain reward CSs and pooled data from the certain 0% and 100% reward CSs. Its
graded uncertainty activity was calculated as the difference in normalized activity between data
from the uncertain 50% reward CS and pooled data from the uncertain 25% and 75% reward
CSs. Neurons were classified as having significant graded uncertainty coding if their graded
uncertainty activity was significantly different from 0 (p < 0.05, rank-sum test). Areas were
classified as having graded uncertainty coding if the number of neurons with significant graded
coding was significantly different from chance levels (p < 0.05, binomial test).
58

Quantification of information seeking behavior during inactivations. Response times
(RTs) were computed online and used to determine when the CS was replaced by the cue,
defined as the time between the ‘go’ signal (i.e. the trial start cue’s disappearance) and the gaze
entering the response window around the CS. To improve the accuracy of RT measurements for
our offline analysis, RTs were recomputed offline using response windows that were corrected
for session-to-session variability in eye tracker settings using the procedure described above (i.e.
centering the window on the observed peak gaze location separately for each CS location and
each session). We then analyzed the RTs from all correctly performed trials in which the animal
made a response and there was at least rough agreement between the online and offline RTs (i.e.
within 0.2 s of each other). These criteria were met by nearly all correctly performed trials
(n=17968/18035; 99.6%). We then quantified the information seeking bias using an Infobias
Index based on the mean RTs for the Info and Noinfo CSs:
Infobias Index = (Noinfo RT – Info RT) / (Noinfo RT + Info RT)
The Infobias Index was computed separately for each session, and separately for each of
the 2 x 2 combinations of time in session (pre- vs post-injection) and CS location relative to
injection site (contralateral vs ipsilateral). We then derived two additional measures. For session
and each CS location, we defined the change in Infobias index as the difference between postinjection and pre-injection Infobias indexes. We defined the change in Infobias laterality as the
difference between the changes in Infobias Index for the contralateral and ipsilateral sides.
To test whether icbDS and Pal inactivations affected information seeking behavior
(Figure 3.7C), we computed the mean change in Infobias index and tested whether it was
significantly different from zero (p < 0.05, permutation test conducted by comparing the true
mean change in Infobias Index to the distribution of mean changes in Infobias Index computed
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on 20000 permuted datasets in which pre- and post-injection data were shuffled with each other).
For pooled data from all inactivation sessions and for control sessions (Figure 3.7C) we used the
same procedure, except to be conservative we included an additional correction for the different
numbers of sessions of each type that were collected from each animal, by using weighted means
such that each animal’s data was weighted by the number of inactivation sessions that animal
contributed to the dataset. The same key results were obtained in uncorrected data (significant
change in contralateral Infobias Index during inactivation sessions, p = 0.0015; no significant
change in Control sessions, p = 0.8786; inactivation sessions significantly different from control
sessions, p = 0.0243).
To test how inactivations interfered with information seeking behavior, we analyzed RTs
separately for Info and Noinfo CSs. RTs were normalized by z-scoring all RTs separately for
each session and CS location. The mean normalized RT was then calculated for each
combination of session, time in session (pre- or post-injection), and CS type (Info or Noinfo CS).
Then for each session and CS type we calculated the change in mean normalized RT (postinjection – pre-injection). Finally, we tested whether the RT changes for each CS type were
different from 0 (signed-rank test on per-session normalized RT changes), and whether the RT
changes for the two CS types were different from each other (signed-rank test on per-session
difference between normalized RT changes for the two CS types).

3.3

Results

3.3.1 Anatomically-connected regions of ACC, icbDS, and Pal contain ramping neurons
that signal reward uncertainty
To identify neural networks that are selectively responsive to reward uncertainty, we
presented monkeys with fractal visual conditioned stimuli (CSs) predicting the delivery of a
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future juice reward with 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% probabilities8,19 while recording across
areas of ACC, icbDS, and Pal (Figure 3.1). All three areas contained numerous neurons that were
strongly activated or inhibited by all the CSs that cued uncertain rewards (Figure 3.2A; Figure
3.2B, cyan, blue, turquoise; 25%, 50%, and 75% reward CSs). These responses were primarily
excitatory in ACC and icbDS and often inhibitory in Pal (Figure 3.2A). The average responses
consisted of sustained ramping to the moment when the uncertain outcome would occur (Figure
3.2A,B). Importantly, unlike conventional reward-related neurons in these areas15,16, these
neurons were more responsive to reward uncertainty than reward value; their responses were
substantially lower for the CSs that cued certain outcomes, even though they had the highest and
lowest values in the task (black, 100%, certain reward; gray, 0%, certain no-reward; Figure
3.2A-C). Furthermore, many of these neurons responded to uncertainty in a graded manner8: they
responded most in the condition with maximal uncertainty (50% reward), less in conditions with
intermediate uncertainty (75% and 25% reward), and least in conditions with no uncertainty
(100% and 0% reward).15 Specifically, neurons with a significantly greater average response to
the 50% CS than to the 75 and 25% CSs were found in all three areas (Figure 3.2D, dark blue; p
< 0.05, signed-rank test), with much greater prevalence than expected by chance (p < 0.001 in
each area, binomial tests), and were significantly more prevalent than the opposite response
pattern (Figure 3.2D, cyan; p < 0.05 in each area, binomial tests).
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Figure 3.1: (A) MRIs were taken immediately after recording uncertainty coding neurons with
the electrode still in place. Shown are coronal views in which the electrode track is visible as a
black ‘shadow’ on the MRI; the yellow arrow indicates the location of the electrode tip. Top:
recording site in ACC, at a location symmetrical to the ACC in the opposite hemisphere. Middle:
recording site in icbDS, at a location intermediate between the body of the caudate and putamen.
Bottom: recording site in Pal, with the tip adjacent to the ventral boundary of the anterior
commissure. Abbreviations: cc, corpus callosum; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Cd,
caudate; Pu, putamen; ac, anterior commissure; Nb, nucleus basalis. (B) Reconstruction of
recording sites in ACC (top), icbDS (middle), and Pal (bottom). Circles indicate locations of
neurons that responded to uncertainty with significant excitation (black) or inhibition (white).
Structures are shown in the coronal plane. Neurons are projected onto the nearest shown plane;
text indicates the range of neuron locations.
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The network refined its uncertainty signals over time. Uncertainty signals emerged
markedly earlier in Pal (Figure 3.2A, arrows; Supplementary Figures 3.1,3.2; significantly
shorter latency in Pal than ACC and icbDS, both p < 0.001, permutation tests) but this initial
signal did not yet encode the graded level of uncertainty (i.e. similar activity for 25, 50, and
75%; Supplementary Figure 3.2). Uncertainty signals later emerged in both ACC and icbDS at
roughly similar latencies (Figure 3.2A; Supplementary Figure 3.1; no significant latency
difference, p = 0.11), and those two areas first significantly encoded the graded level of
uncertainty, doing so before Pal (50 > 25,75%, Figure 3.2A; Supplementary Figure 3.2). These
results indicate that a rapid but rough Pal uncertainty signal is followed by a slower, graded
signal in cortico-striatal areas. Further, these results match the precise anatomical tracers
performed by our collaborators in the Dr. Suzanne Haber Laboratory outlined in detail in the full
manuscript from which this chapter was adapted.
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Figure 3.2: (A) Example responses to the uncertainty task from neurons in ACC (top), icbDS
(middle), and Pal (bottom). The ACC and icbDS neurons have excitatory ramping activity up to
the time of uncertain reward: strongest for highly uncertain rewards (blue, 50%), strong for
moderately uncertain rewards (turquoise colors, 25% and 75%), and weak or absent for certain
outcomes (black, 100%; gray, 0%). The Pal neuron has similar ramping activity with an
opposite, inhibitory direction of response. Top of panel: times of each spike (dots) on each trial
(rows). Bottom of panel: smoothed firing rate for each CS. (B) The population average
normalized activity of uncertainty coding neurons in each area ramps up to the time of the
uncertain outcome. Shaded areas are ± 1 SE. Arrow, dashed line, and text indicate each area’s
latency of uncertainty coding. Gray area below x-axis is the pre-outcome analysis time window.
(C) Population average pre-outcome normalized activity is well fitted with a second-order
polynomial function of reward probability (gray lines; shaded areas are ± 1 bootstrap SE)
indicating an inverted-U relationship between reward probability and neural responses, as
expected for uncertainty coding. (D) Graded coding of reward uncertainty. Histograms show
each neuron’s difference in normalized activity between CSs with high (50%) vs. moderate
(25,75%) reward uncertainty. Arrows indicate the mean. Colored neurons have significantly
differential activity. In all areas, more neurons are significantly more active for high uncertainty
(blue) than moderate uncertainty (turquoise). *** indicates more neurons than expected by
chance (p ≤ 0.001).
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3.3.2 Many uncertainty-selective neurons across this network anticipate uncertainty
resolution through the delivery of advance information
Our findings thus far identify an interconnected cortico-BG network that signals reward
uncertainty with ramping anticipatory activity. This raises a few key questions: what event is the
network anticipating? Most crucially, does the network anticipate the moment of receiving an
uncertain outcome per se, or the moment of receiving information to resolve the uncertainty?
To answer these questions, we designed a task to separate the time of receiving
information from the time of receiving the outcome (information viewing task, Figure 3.3A). On
each trial the monkey was shown a fractal CS that indicated that a reward would be delivered in
3 seconds with 100%, 50%, or 0% probability. There were two types of CSs. Informative CSs
(Info CSs) were followed after 1 second by an informative visual cue whose color indicated the
upcoming outcome (e.g. orange → reward, gray → no reward). Non-informative CSs (Noinfo
CSs) were followed by a non-informative cue whose color was randomized on each trial and
hence did not indicate the upcoming outcome. Importantly, there was no way for animals to use
the information to control or influence the outcome. Thus, neurons that simply anticipate
uncertain rewards should respond differently during the Info and Noinfo 50% reward CSs,
because only the Noinfo 50% outcome is uncertain at the time of delivery (Figure 3.3C).
However, neurons that anticipate information should activate specifically in advance of the time
when the animal expects to be informed of the outcome, which occurs at different times on Info
and Noinfo trials: on Info trials information is delivered after 1 second by the informative cue
(Figure 3.3C, red arrow), while on Noinfo trials the animal is first informed of the outcome after
3 seconds by receiving the outcome (juice delivery or omission) at the end of the trial (Figure
3.3C, blue arrow).
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Figure 3.3: (A) Information viewing task. On Info CS trials, CSs predict 100, 50, or 0% reward,
and are followed by an informative cue that indicates the outcome with certainty. On Noinfo CS
trials, analogous CSs are followed by one of two non-informative cues that are randomized and
hence leave the outcome uncertain until it is delivered at the end of the trial. (B) Left: Mean
fraction of trials of each type in which a lick was detected in the 500 ms before cue onset. Data
are from n=18 sessions in which licking was measured and there was reliable differential licking
that distinguished 100% reward from 0% reward trials. Licks occurred before the cue on ~5% or
fewer trials, indicating that animals had little or no expectation that juice would be delivered at
the time of the cue. Notably, the Info 50% reward CS evoked intense gaze and neural activity in
anticipation of the informative cue (Fig 3), but evoked near-zero licking, indicating that the
information-related behavior and neural activity cannot be accounted for by expectation of juice
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reward. If anything, there was slightly but significantly less licking for the Info 50% reward CS
than for the other Info CSs. There were significant but small differences in licking between some
other conditions as well (Noinfo 50% vs 0%, p = 0.005; Info 50% vs 0%, p = 0.001; Info 50% vs
100%, p = 0.032). Right: Same as left, for the 500 ms before outcome delivery. Licks occurred
on a large fraction of trials, indicating that animals expected juice to be delivered at the time of
the outcome. Licking was generally consistent with the mean reward in each condition. On
Noinfo trials licking significantly increased with reward probability (100% > 50%, p = 0.003;
50% > 0%, p = 0.044; signed-rank tests). On Info trials licking was significantly greater after
reward was cued than after no-reward was cued, both for trials in which reward was initially
uncertain (50%→reward > 50%→no reward, p = 0.001) and trials when reward was initially
certain (100% > 0%, p < 0.001). (C) Left: if neurons ramp to the receipt of information, they
should also ramp to informative cues on Info trials (red). Right: if neural uncertainty signals
simply anticipate uncertain juice delivery, they should only ramp up to uncertain outcomes on
Noinfo trials (blue).
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Indeed, the cortico-BG network contained a substantial population of neurons that
anticipated the receipt of information to resolve reward uncertainty. We quantified each neuron’s
uncertainty signal using the ROC area for using its firing rate to distinguish trials with uncertain
rewards vs certain rewards (50% vs 100% and 0%). We then calculated an “Info Cue
Anticipation Index” defined as its uncertainty signal during the last 0.5 sec of the Info CSs (just
before an informative cue) minus its uncertainty signal during the same time window for the
Noinfo CSs (just before a non-informative cue). Neurons with significant Info Cue Anticipation
Indexes were highly prevalent in all three areas of the network (Figure 3.4D,E; 47%, 54%, and
50% of recorded neurons in ACC, icbDS, and Pal (n=9/19, 13/24, and 21/42, respectively); more
than expected by chance, all p < 0.05, binomial tests).
Importantly, as expected for an information-anticipatory signal, the same neurons that
anticipated informative cues on Info trials also commonly anticipated uncertain outcomes on
Noinfo trials, and did so in similar manners. For example, the icbDS neuron in Figure 3.4A was
strongly activated on uncertain reward trials in advance of both informative cues (top, red) and
uninformed outcomes (bottom, blue), while the Pal neuron in Figure 3.4B was inhibited in
advance of these task events. To quantify this, we defined an analogous “Uncertain Outcome
Anticipation Index” as the change in a neuron’s uncertainty signal from the beginning to the end
of the cue period on Noinfo trials. This index was significant in a substantial number of single
neurons in all three areas (21%, 63%, and 31% of neurons in ACC, icbDS, and Pal; more
neurons than expected by chance in all areas, binomial tests, all p < 0.05) and was most prevalent
in icbDS (higher fraction of significant neurons in icbDS than ACC or Pal, both p < 0.05,
binomial tests). There was a strong correlation between the two neural anticipation indexes (rank
correlation = 0.45, p < 0.001, Figure 3.4E). That is, many neurons, especially in ACC and icbDS,
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were activated in anticipation of receiving information from both cues and outcomes, while other
neurons, especially in Pal, were inhibited for both. Thus, when examining neurons whose
uncertainty signals on Noinfo trials significantly anticipated the outcome, the average timecourse
of their uncertainty signals on Info trials bore a strong resemblance to a hypothetical
information-anticipatory signal (Figure 3.3C, Figure 3.4F; similar results for all three areas,
Supplementary Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: (A) An example icbDS neuron had strong ramping activity anticipating the time of
receiving information about uncertain rewards: the informative cue on Info trials (top, red) and
outcome delivery on Noinfo trials (bottom, blue). This activity was greatly reduced or absent
when the outcome was certain (black, gray). (B) An example Pal neuron had a similar response
pattern but with ramping inhibition instead of excitation. (C) Differential uncertainty signals
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emerge in anticipation of informative cues. Each row is a neuron, and the color at each time
point indicates the difference between its uncertainty signals on Info vs Noinfo trials. Color
indicates sign of coding (red: more positive uncertainty signal for Info; blue: more negative
uncertainty signal for Info; color bar indicates scale). (D) Information-anticipatory activity was
significantly present in approximately half of uncertainty-related neurons in each area. ***
indicates significantly more neurons than expected by chance, p < 0.001. (E) Correlated
anticipation of the two reward-informative task events. Many neurons have significant
Informative Cue Anticipation Indexes (red, y-axis), Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Indexes
(blue, x-axis), or both (purple). The two indexes are highly correlated; text indicates rank
correlation and its p-value. ACC, icbDS, and Pal neurons are indicated by triangles, squares, and
circles. Black line is a linear fit with type 2 regression. (F) The population average uncertainty
signal from neurons with ramping uncertainty signals on Noinfo trials (blue) closely resembles
Hypothesis 2: they also have strong ramping activity on Info trials that anticipates the time of
viewing the informative cue (red). Error bars are ± 1 SE. Gray areas are the time windows for
calculating the indexes of cue anticipation (pre-cue window) and outcome anticipation (post-cue,
pre-outcome windows).
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3.3.3 Monkeys preferentially direct their gaze towards objects associated with uncertainty
Given the cortico-BG network’s strong information-predictive signal, we next asked
whether information predictions evoke information seeking behavior in monkeys. Since
monkeys, like humans, scan uncertain environments for information with their eyes15,26,171, we
hypothesized that monkeys may anticipate information by directing their gaze to objects in their
environment associated with the uncertainty to be resolved. Consistent with previous work, we
found that monkeys licked in anticipation of juice rewards (Figure 3.3B) and that their gaze was
attracted to visual objects based on their expected reward value (Figure 3.5A, 100% CS > 0% CS
(black > gray), informative reward cue > no-reward cue (dark red > light red)).
Strikingly, however, monkeys’ gaze was even more strongly attracted to objects based on
their uncertainty, especially in the moments before receiving information to resolve that
uncertainty. On Info trials, monkeys could anticipate receiving information during the Info 50%
reward CS as they awaited the upcoming informative cue (Figure 3.5A, red arrow). Monkeys
were substantially more likely to gaze at the Info 50% reward CS than all other CSs (signed-rank
tests, all p < 0.001). Importantly, this attraction of gaze was specifically related to upcoming
information rather than to reward value or uncertainty per se. Monkeys gazed at the Info 50%
reward CS more than at the Noinfo 50% reward CS, which was associated with exactly the same
reward value and uncertainty but was not followed by information (Figure 3.5B), and more than
at the 100% reward CSs, which were associated with double the reward value but had no
uncertainty to resolve (Figure 3.5A,B). Furthermore, this intense gaze at the Info 50% reward CS
occurred despite near-zero licking, indicating that animals were anticipating the delivery of
information, not juice reward (Figure 3.3B).
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Figure 3.5: (A) Monkey’s gaze on Noinfo trials is attracted to objects in anticipation of outcome
delivery Lines indicate the probability at each millisecond that the animal gazes at the stimulus.
Shaded areas indicate ± 1 SE (most too small to see). On uncertain 50% reward trials monkeys
gazed less at the CS than on 100% reward trials, but while viewing the non-informative cues
their gaze ramped up in anticipation of the outcome until it became greater on uncertain 50%
than on 100% reward trials. (B) Monkeys’ gaze on Info trials is attracted to CSs in anticipation
of receiving informative cues about uncertain rewards. Same format as (A). Monkeys gazed
more at the 100% CS (black) than the 0% CS (gray), but gazed most of all at the uncertain 50%
CS (red) which could be followed by informative cues indicating either reward (dark red) or no
reward (pink). *, **, *** indicates p < 0.05, 0.01, 0.001. Monkeys’ gaze at reward cues then
ramped up to the time of reward delivery, while gaze at no-reward cues was minimal. (C)
Uncertainty-related gaze behavior in each animal significantly anticipated informative cues (yaxis) and uncertain outcomes (x-axis). Same format as Fig 3.4E, but analyzing gaze instead of
neural activity. Colors indicate animals; light dots are single sessions; dark dots are means ± 1
SE
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Similarly, on Noinfo trials, monkeys could anticipate receiving information at the end of
the cue period as they awaited the upcoming reward delivery or omission (Figure 3.5B, blue
arrow). Again, at that time the monkeys gazed at the cue more during Noinfo 50% reward trials
than all other conditions (all p < 0.001), even 100% reward trials that had double the reward
value (Figure 3.5A,B). They did so even though the upcoming information about the outcome
was delivered through a non-visual modality (receipt of juice or no juice), and even though
100%, 50%, and 0% Noinfo trials all used exactly the same set of visual cue stimuli; they gazed
at those cues most avidly on Noinfo 50% reward trials when they were associated with an
uncertain reward, and did so specifically in the moments before the uncertainty was going to be
resolved. These monkeys also behaved consistently in standard uncertainty-related tasks that
lacked informative cues (essentially treating all trials as Noinfo because no cues were available).
Thus, when we analyzed monkeys’ gaze behavior in the same way that we analyzed neural
spiking activity, we found that all monkeys had significantly positive Info Cue Anticipation and
Uncertain Outcome Anticipation indexes, indicative of information-anticipatory behavior (Figure
3.5C, all p < 0.001, signed-rank test). Next, we compared neuronal activity preceding
information delivery when the monkeys’ gaze was on the stimulus compared to when the gaze
was off of the stimulus. We found that neural information signals were present even at moments
when the monkeys’ gaze was away from the stimuli, but were significantly enhanced during
matched time points from other trials when the monkeys’ gaze was off the stimulus. This was
true in both the information and standard uncertainty tasks (Figure 3.6).
This data suggested that the cortico-BG network’s information signals could be well
suited to motivate the animal’s information-oriented behavior – a hypothesis we next tested
through direct pharmacological disruption.
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Figure 3.6: Mean normalized activity before receipt of information is enhanced when gaze is on
the stimulus (dark dots/lines) compared to when gaze is off the stimulus (light dots/lines),
especially for intermediate reward probabilities when reward is uncertain. Error bars are ± 1 SE;
asterisks indicate significance.
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3.3.4 Pharmacologically inactivating areas of BG that contain uncertainty-selective neurons
causally decreases information-seeking behaviors
Given these findings, we hypothesized that information-predictive neurons in the basal
ganglia have a causal role in motivating gaze shifts to gain information. If so, then temporarily
inactivating the basal ganglia subregions that contain these neurons should impair the motivation
to seek information. We therefore trained monkeys to perform a task in which gaze shifts were
required to gain information (information seeking task, Figure 3.7A). Monkeys fixated a spot of
light and then continued to fixate during a delay period while a 50% reward CS was presented on
either the left or right side of the screen. After the fixation point disappeared (‘go’ signal) the
monkey was free to gaze in any manner they chose. On trials with an Info CS, gazing at the CS
caused it to be immediately replaced by an informative cue indicating the trial’s outcome (reward
or no reward). On trials with a Noinfo CS, gazing at the CS caused it to be replaced by a noninformative cue. Importantly, the monkeys’ gaze at the CS allowed them to gain information
about the outcome but did not allow them to influence the outcome itself in any way (i.e. the
outcome always occurred a fixed time after the ‘go’ signal regardless of whether and how they
gazed at the CS). In addition, we used a fixed-duration delay period between CS onset and the go
signal to allow animals to anticipate the moment when information would become available.
Indeed, animals had strongly anticipatory behavior, at times shifting their gaze onto the CS at
short latencies before they could have perceived and reacted to the ‘go’ signal (Figure 3.7B,
response times (RTs) < 50 ms). Monkeys were highly motivated to seek information, shown by
their much faster RTs to shift their gaze onto Info CSs than Noinfo CSs (Figure 3.7B). We
quantified the response bias favoring the info CSs with an “Infobias Index” (Figure 3.7B) which
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was significantly positive in every session for every animal (n=43/43 sessions, all p < 0.05,
permutation tests).
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Figure 3.7: (A) Information seeking task. Monkeys were shown a CS, waited for a ‘go’ signal,
and then were allowed to gaze at it. Gazing at an Info or Noinfo CS caused it to be replaced with
an appropriate informative or non-informative cue. Regardless of whether or when animals
gazed at the CS, the outcome was delivered a fixed time after CS onset. (B) RT distribution for
animal B. The animal had much faster RTs for Info trials (red, mean = 144 ms) than Noinfo trials
(blue, mean = 239 ms). The animal often anticipated the time that information would become
available, as indicated by the prevalence of anticipatory saccades especially on Info trials (e.g.
RTs < 50 ms). This histogram includes all data that was collected when inactivations were not
being performed. It shows n=1962/1966 (99.8%) of those RTs; not visible are four outliers from
Noinfo trials (RT = 0.741, 0.748, 1.326, 1.335 s). Text indicates the equation for the Infobias
Index. (C) Muscimol inactivation effect on RTs to contralateral CSs, quantified as the change in
Infobias Index (after– before). There are significant reductions in Infobias Index for icbDS
inactivations (green), Pal inactivations (blue), and all inactivations (black), but not control
sessions (gray). *, **, *** indicate p < 0.05, 0.01, 0.001. Error bars are ± 1 SE. (D) Cumulative
distributions showing each session’s inactivation effect on the Infobias Index for contralateral
CSs. Inactivation sessions consistently reduce the information bias while control sessions do not.
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Consistent with the lateralized functions of basal ganglia circuitry196,197, we predicted that
unilateral inactivations would reduce information seeking behavior directed toward objects in
contralateral space. Indeed, unilateral injections of muscimol, a GABAA agonist, into either
icbDS or Pal in the vicinity where information-anticipatory neurons were recorded caused the
information seeking response bias to be significantly reduced in contralateral space (Figure
3.7C,D; icbDS, n=9 sessions, p = 0.028; Pal, n=8 sessions, p = 0.031; all inactivations, n=17, p =
0.001; permutation tests; see Supplementary Figures 3.3 for injection sites and effects in each
session). No significant change was observed in a control dataset consisting of sham and saline
injections (Figure 3.7C, gray, n=26 sessions, p = 0.93). In addition, inactivations had no
significant effect on information seeking for ipsilateral CSs (all p > 0.4, Supplementary Figure
3.5). Thus, relative to control sessions, inactivations caused the information seeking bias to
become lateralized – significantly shifted away from the contralateral side (p = 0.019,
Supplementary Figure 3.5).
We further investigated the mechanism by which icbDS and Pal activity promote
information seeking. Our data suggest that icbDS and Pal have reciprocal inhibitory connections
and tend to encode information predictions in opposite manners, with icbDS neurons activated
and Pal neurons commonly inhibited (Figures 3.2,3.3). We therefore hypothesized that icbDS
and Pal activity have opposite influences on motivated gaze behavior, such that informationoriented gaze shifts are motivated by icbDS activity and suppressed by Pal activity. The icbDS is
primarily active during the Info CS, so inactivation should slow gaze shifts to the Info CS while
leaving responses to the Noinfo CS relatively intact. Conversely, Pal is normally inhibited during
the Info CS, so inactivation should leave responses to the Info CS relatively intact while
speeding gaze shifts to the Noinfo CS. Both of these predictions were borne out in the data.
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Inactivation of icbDS slowed gaze shifts to the Info CS but did not significantly change RTs to
the Noinfo CS (Supplementary Figure 3.6B, left, Info CS p = 0.0003, Noinfo CS p = 0.64, ranksum tests; significantly different changes for Info vs Noinfo, p = 0.0081, permutation tests).
Conversely, inactivation of Pal speeded gaze shifts to the Noinfo CS but did not significantly
change RTs to the Info CS (Supplementary Figure 3.6B, center, Info CS p = 0.17, Noinfo CS p =
0.001; significantly different changes for Info vs Noinfo, p = 0.0046). Thus, icbDS activity
motivated gaze shifts to gain information, while Pal activity suppressed motivation to gaze at
objects that would not yield information.
Importantly, these inactivation effects on information seeking were not caused by
generalized effects on overall motivation to perform the task, which could potentially be affected
by inactivation of striatum and pallidum circuitry involved in primary reward seeking
behavior.198–202 Specifically, icbDS inactivations slowed RTs to the Info CS without reducing
measures of general motivation, while Pal inactivations speeded RTs to the Noinfo CS without
increasing measures of general motivation (Supplementary Figure 3.7). If anything, Pal
inactivations speeded RTs to the Noinfo CS in spite of a modest reduction in general motivation
to perform the task (Supplementary Figure 3.7), consistent with similar reductions of motivation
from previous Pal inactivations.198–201

3.4

Discussion
Our work demonstrates the existence of a neural network responsible for motivating

actions to resolve uncertain situations by seeking knowledge about future rewards. Previous
studies identified cortical and basal ganglia networks that make conventional predictions about
when future rewards are available and motivate behavior to seek those rewards.2,184,196,203 Indeed,
our monkeys had strong tendencies to gaze at visual stimuli based on their reward value.
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However, the novel ACC-icbDS-Pal neurons we report here have relatively little response to
reward value, and hence their primary function is not likely to be control of such reward valueoriented behavior. Instead, they have a quite distinct function: they predict when information will
become available to resolve reward uncertainty and motivate gaze behavior to obtain that
information. This information seeking gaze behavior can be even more potent than the attraction
of gaze to primary reward: our monkeys gazed much more avidly at the CS that provided
informative cues than at any other stimulus, even CSs and cues that were associated with double
its expected reward value. Our data show that this information seeking gaze behavior is very
similar to activity observed in the cortico-BG network.
Our data is crucial evidence for theories of reward learning, overt attention, and
economic decision making, which propose that objects and events in the world are assigned
salience both by neural systems that track primary reward value and its uncertainty170,179,204,205,
and by a system that anticipates information to resolve uncertainty.26,29,206–208 Furthermore, our
data demonstrates a neural mechanism through which information seeking can compete and
interact with primary reward to drive ongoing behavior.28,171,209,210
In fact, information seeking goes hand-in-hand with primary reward seeking in natural
environments. Most experimental studies of reward seeking begin with the presentation of a cue
stimulus (or an environmental context) that tells the subject what reward to predict and what
actions are needed to obtain it. However, rewards in natural environments can be scarce and
uncertain, and fully predictive reward cues rarely come for free or materialize from thin air. In
these situations, organisms must first seek and obtain information about the rewards that are
available in their environment; only then can they predict the value of those rewards and use that
value to motivate reward seeking behavior. In this sense, the cortico-BG network for information
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seeking may be critical to ensure that organisms seek out the reward-related cues in their
environment that are necessary for the proper operation of the well-known networks that predict
and seek primary rewards.2,184,196,203,210 Indeed, information-related neurons in all three areas
were intermixed with other neurons that encoded the reward value of stimuli and
outcomes2,184,196,203,210, indicating that information- and reward-related neurons are wellpositioned to support each other’s computations.
While information-anticipatory signals were present in all three areas of the cortico-BG
network, each area also had distinct features suitable for unique contributions to information
seeking. Notably, fluctuations in ACC information signals were the earliest predictor of future
behavior. ACC information signals changed several hundred milliseconds before gaze shifts,
while BG signals changed more proximally to behavior. This finding supports and extends
theories that ACC is especially important for motivating behavioral shifts to explore available
prospects and learn their reward value and other properties211–213, tracking their level of
uncertainty and how it evolves over time as beliefs are updated in response to surprising
outcomes4,212,214–218, and using this information to decide how to control future cognition and
behavior.212,219 In particular, while it is well acknowledged that the ACC needs to receive a broad
array of reward- and uncertainty-related information to perform these functions209,219, our data
indicates that the ACC is not merely a passive recipient of this information; rather, the ACC is
tightly linked to the emergence of motivational drive to actively seek out that information from
the environment.
In addition, our findings indicate that information seeking behavior is motivated by a BG
circuit mechanism that is analogous but distinct from the BG circuits that motivate conventional
reward-seeking behavior. There are two key parallels. First, behavior-related fluctuations in BG
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information signals follow fluctuations in cortex and are proximal to behavioral gaze shifts. This
is consistent with classic theories of cortico-BG circuits90 and work on cortex-striatum
interactions220–222 suggesting that cognitive and motivational signals can be computed in cortex
and then sent to BG where they are processed and used to guide behavior. Second, the specific
functions of each BG subregion in information seeking are consistent with classical BG circuit
motifs: notably, icbDS and Pal neurons commonly encode information signals with opposite
signs and these areas have opposite causal influences on behavior, such that icbDS activity
speeds gaze shifts to gain information while Pal activity slows gaze shifts that will not provide
information. This resembles analogous findings for BG areas involved in primary reward
seeking: antagonizing D1 receptors in visuomotor dorsal striatum slows gaze shifts to gain large
juice rewards87, while inactivation of Pal speeds gaze shifts to gain small juice rewards.199
Importantly, however, the BG mechanisms underlying physical reward- and informationoriented behavior are at least partially distinct at the neuronal and behavioral levels: (1) when
animals avidly gazed at the Info CS in anticipation of viewing the informative cue, they had
near-zero licking behavior, indicating that they were not anticipating juice reward; (2) the
cortical and BG neurons we identified that are linked to information-anticipatory behavior
primarily anticipated the moment of gaining information, not the moment of gaining juice
reward; and (3) inactivation effects on information seeking could not be explained as a result of
generalized effects on juice reward seeking. Thus, this cortico-BG network appears to be
specially focused on online information seeking behavior. This is in contrast to other BG circuits
and interconnected areas involved in reward prediction errors and reinforcement, which
commonly encode information and primary reward in a common currency.26,28 In addition,
whereas classical theories of cortico-BG circuits that classify Pal as an output structure90,223, our
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data extends previous results201 by showing that Pal in fact responds earliest to uncertaintyrelated events. This is consistent with theories that BG rapidly selects salient stimuli to guide
future behavior.224,225 Our data supports a scenario in which (A) Pal first signals a rapid, rough
assessment of reward uncertainty; (B) ACC and icbDS first signal the precise graded level of
uncertainty; and (C) the resulting representation of uncertainty ramps up to the time of its
resolution by information, and drives ongoing information seeking behavior.
Given the link between the ACC-icbDS-Pal network and information seeking behavior,
variations in the network’s activity could be responsible for the natural variations in information
seeking behavior that are commonly found across individuals185,210,216 and tasks.226,227 In the
same vein, it is notable that ACC and BG are implicated as sites of dysfunction and targets for
treatment in human disorders of motivated behavior (such as obsessive-compulsive
disorder228,229, Parkinson’s disease230, and drug addiction58) that are known to affect reward- and
uncertainty-related behavior.231–236 Our results raise the possibility that these disorders and
treatments may also affect the motivation to seek information about future events. While this has
been little studied, there is evidence that Parkinson’s disease reduces the motivation to gather
information needed for upcoming decisions237 and impairs learning from early access to
information about uncertain outcomes238 Taken together, our work provides a foundation for
understanding the neural network mechanisms by which information is detected, predicted, and
used to motivate behavior.

3.5

Supplementary material
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Supplementary Figure 3.1: (A) Cumulative distribution of latencies for all single neurons
recorded during standard uncertainty tasks that had detected latencies of uncertainty coding.
Circles, dashed vertical lines, and text indicate the estimated population latency of uncertainty
coding in each area (error bars are ± 1 bootstrap SE). Uncertainty signals emerge first in Pal,
followed by ACC and icbDS at similar latencies. (B) Heat map of uncertainty coding over time
for the neurons in (A). Top: ACC; middle: icbDS; bottom: Pal. Each row is a neuron. Black dots
indicate the detected latency of uncertainty coding. Color indicates the neuron’s uncertainty
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coding at each time during the task (red = more active for uncertain than certain CSs, blue = less
active for uncertain than certain CSs, white = no uncertainty coding). Uncertainty coding for is
quantified based on the ROC area for using the neuron’s activity to discriminate between
uncertain vs certain CSs. For this latency analysis we conservatively calculate the uncertainty
coding at each time point as the least extreme of two ROC areas: one for discriminating all
uncertain CSs from the 100% reward CS, and the other for discriminating all uncertain CSs from
the 0% reward CS. Uncertainty coding is predominantly excitatory in ACC, almost exclusively
excitatory in icbDS, and predominantly inhibitory in Pal.
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Supplementary Figure 3.2: In order to directly compare rough and graded uncertainty-related
activity, they are both quantified here in terms of normalized activity. (A) Population average
rough uncertainty signal for each area, defined as the difference in mean normalized activity
between uncertain CSs (25%,50%, and 75%) and certain CSs (0% and 100%). The shaded area is
± 1 SE. Asterisks indicate significant differences from 0 (signed-rank test, p < 0.05). Consistent
with the latency analysis in Fig S1, the rough uncertainty signal reaches significance first in Pal
and later in ACC and icbDS. (B) Population average graded uncertainty signal in each area,
defined as the difference in mean normalized activity between the maximally uncertain CS
(50%) and the moderately uncertain CSs (25% and 75%). There is a trend for a graded
uncertainty coding at all time points in all areas, but it grows and reaches significance first in
ACC and icbDS, and later in Pal. Thus, while rough uncertainty coding emerges first in Pal,
graded uncertainty coding becomes prevalent first in ACC and icbDS.

87

Supplementary Figure 3.3: (A) Reconstructed 3D coordinates of each neuron in the dataset,
shown for all areas (indicated by colors) and all animals (indicated by symbols; see legend).
Coordinates are relative to the midline, superior tip of the anterior commissure (AC). Top shows
coordinates in the horizontal plane. Bottom shows coordinates in the coronal plane. The three
areas where uncertainty-responsive neurons were found were clearly anatomically distinct from
each other, and were located in similar, overlapping locations in all animals. (B) Same as (A)
with an overlay showing the reconstructed coordinates of the injection sites. Colors indicate area
(icbDS or Pal) and substance (muscimol or saline; see legend). The injection sites for icbDS and
Pal were clearly distinct from each other and overlapped the locations of uncertainty-responsive
neurons in their respective areas. The injection sites for saline overlapped with the injection sites
for muscimol in the same area.
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Supplementary Figure 3.4: Same as Fig 3.2G,H, plotted separately for each area. (A,C,E) Same
as Fig 2H for each area. The average uncertainty signal of neurons that had a significant ramping
uncertainty activity measured only using Noinfo trials (i.e. cells with a significant Uncertain
Outcome Anticipation Index, p < 0.05, permutation test). Note that these neurons are selected
solely based on their activity anticipating the outcome on Noinfo trials. Even so, in all areas
these populations show a strong uncertainty signal in the same direction anticipating the cue on
Info trials. Thus, these neural populations had information-anticipatory activity resembling the
theoretical pattern in Fig 2G. (B,D,F) Same as Fig 2G for each area. Best-fit lines from type 2
regression are plotted for all areas with significant correlations (p < 0.05); arrows are plotted for
all areas with significant mean indexes different from 0 (p < 0.05). All areas show coding
indexes consistent with information-anticipatory activity, though in different manners due to the
different signs of neural coding in icbDS vs ACC and Pal. icbDS shows an especially strong
pattern of information-anticipatory activity. icbDS neurons only encode uncertainty with a
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positive sign, and nearly all neurons are in the upper right quadrant, indicating positive
anticipation of both informative cues and uncertain outcomes (mean Info Cue Anticipation Index
= +0.27, mean Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index = +0.24; both significantly greater than 0,
signed-rank tests, both p < 0.0001). These two indexes are generally consistent across neurons
with relatively low variability so there is no significant correlation between them (rho = -0.27, p
= 0.195). By contrast, ACC and Pal populations included subsets of neurons with different signs
and variable strengths of uncertainty coding in standard uncertainty tasks (Fig S1). As a result,
information-anticipatory activity should not necessarily lead to non-zero population average
indexes, but should result in the two indexes being correlated, indicating that individual neurons
anticipate both informative cues and uncertain outcomes in similar manners. Indeed, in both
areas there is a strong and significant correlation such that cells with a more positive Info Cue
Anticipation Index also have a more positive Uncertain Outcome Anticipation Index (ACC: p =
0.018; Pal: p = 0.015) – the same pattern seen in Fig 2I for the population of all uncertaintyresponsive neurons across the network.
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Supplementary Figure 3.5: (A) Mean Infobias Index in each animal. All animals had
significantly positive Infobias Indexes in the mean over all sessions shown here and in all
individual sessions (n=43/43; all p < 0.05, permutation tests). (B) No apparent change in Infobias
Indexes for ipsilateral CSs. Same format as Fig 4C, but for ipsilateral CSs. There is no
significant change resulting from inactivations and no significant difference between
inactivations and control. (C) Inactivations change the laterality of information seeking behavior
relative to control sessions. Inset: cumulative distributions of change in infobias laterality for
inactivations (black) and controls (gray). Change in infobias laterality was quantified as: (change
in Infobias Index for contralateral CSs) – (change in Infobias Index for ipsilateral CSs). Bar plot:
difference in the change in infobias laterality between inactivations and controls. Error bars are ±
bootstrap SE. The change in infobias laterality was more negative for inactivations than controls
(p = 0.019, permutation test), indicating that information seeking behavior was shifted away
from the contralateral side relative to controls.
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Supplementary Figure 3.6: (A) Predictions: the two BG areas should influence information
seeking in distinct manners, such that icbDS inactivation slows RTs to obtain information (left,
Info CS, red), Pal inactivation speeds RTs that will not obtain information (middle, Noinfo CS,
blue), and controls have no effect (right). (B) Inactivation results, quantified by comparing
normalized RTs (Methods) for the Info CS (red) and Noinfo CS (blue) before vs. after
inactivation. icbDS inactivation slowed RTs to the Info CS without any significant effect on
Noinfo RTs (left); Pal inactivation speeded RTs to Noinfo CS without any significant effect on
Info RTs (middle); control sessions had no significant effect on RTs to either CS (right). Error
bars are ± 1 SE.
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Supplementary Figure 3.7: Inactivation effects on general motivation and reward responsiveness.
We quantified the animal’s motivation to perform the task using two conventional measures of
general motivation: the response time to initiate a trial by fixating on the fixation point on
correctly performed trials and the probability of making an error during the trial (C). To
summarize these measures and gain statistical power to detect any potential small effect of
inactivation on motivation, we created a composite Motivation Index (A,B) pooling these
measures by z-scoring each measure within each animal, averaging the two measures within each
session, and then flipping its sign (so that positive Motivation Index indicates higher motivation
to perform the task).
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Neuroscientists, psychologists, and economists alike have long reported that humans and
nonhuman animals often prefer to resolve uncertainty about the future at the earliest possible
timepoint. This preference is strong enough that humans and nonhuman primates are willing to
sacrifice an amount of upcoming reward in order to obtain information about uncertain
outcomes, even if this information does nothing to change the value or timing of the outcome.
These findings suggest that the information about uncertain outcomes itself has motivational
value. In this thesis, we drew inspiration from the large body of research which identifies and
describes how the brain monitors, predicts, and motivates behaviors toward pursuing primary
rewards. Prior studies detailed diverse cortico-BG networks which contribute to these rewardseeking behaviors. Despite the importance of reward-related information to survival, there
remain expansive gaps in there literature as to how the brain motivates behaviors towards
uncertainty resolution through information seeking.
Here we presented two studies which expand our understanding of signals within the
primate brain that underlie reward uncertainty processing and may play a direct role in
motivating information-seeking behaviors:
In the first study we identified a population of neurons within specific, internal capsulebordering regions of the dorsal striatum which selectively respond to objects associated with
uncertain outcomes. We found that the response of these neurons was selective only to uncertain
rewarding outcomes and not punishing ones and that it discriminated between objects which
predicted different levels of reward uncertainty. We reported that this activity was largely objectpresence-dependent and could be reduced by removing the object prior to outcome delivery and
that it evolved rapidly as animals learned the value of new object-outcome associations.
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Working with our collaborators in the Dr. Suzanne Haber Laboratory, we were able
determine the locations of projection sites from ACC to icbDS, as well as between areas of
icbDS and pallidum. The regions that project or receive inputs from icbDS contained uncertainty
and information anticipation signals similar to icbDS.
In the second study we interrogated the response of single neurons across an identified
neural network which spans areas of cortex and BG and found that this activity motivates
information-seeking behaviors that resolve uncertain outcomes. First, we confirmed the existence
of neurons whose activity was modulated by reward uncertainty in areas of ACC, icbDS, and
pallidum. We then demonstrated that a significant portion of neurons in each of these three areas
‘shifted’ their uncertainty-anticipatory signal to task epochs where uncertainty was resolved by
the delivery of advance information, rather than by the task outcome itself. Moreover, we found
that each brain area had distinct characteristics in its information-anticipatory signal and that the
sign of each signal is congruent with observed anatomy between these structures. We
demonstrated that during uncertainty monkeys preferentially direct their gaze at objects
associated with gaining information to resolve uncertainty, looking more frequently at these
objects in the time preceding uncertainty resolution. This behavior is much like the observed
changes in uncertainty-related activity in the ACC, icbDS, and pallidum neurons. Finally, we
demonstrated that monkeys shift their gaze faster towards objects which give information about
uncertain outcomes and that differences between reaction times to informed and non-informed
objects can be altered by disrupting the activity of BG members of this network. By inactivating
areas of either the DS or pallidum, we were able to decrease information-seeking bias by
differentially influencing reaction time towards informative and non-informative secondary cues.
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Following inactivations in DS, subjects were slower to shift their gaze towards informative cues
where inactivations in pallidum resulted in faster gaze shifts towards non-informative cues.
In natural environments reward-seeking and information-seeking behaviors are often
performed in conjunction with one another; animals must first seek out information about
primary rewards within their environment and then act to pursue those rewards. The level of
uncertainty in a situation is a crucial variable for determining when information is necessary and
when it can be learned from objects within an environment. Our research sheds light on the
mechanisms by which similar brain areas- and even similar network structure motifs- that
motivate behaviors towards pursuing primary rewards also motivate behavior towards seeking
information to resolve uncertainty about those rewards.
Within the BG, for example, previous studies identified contrasting roles of the dorsal
striatum and pallidum in guiding behavior towards primary rewards of different sizes. When DS
activity was disrupted, animals’ gazes were slower to shift towards objects which gave large
rewards.87 Conversely, inactivations within pallidum produced faster reaction times to objects
which gave small rewards.199 Here, we reported corresponding effects, but which are specific to
information-seeking preferences rather than reward size.
Our findings also provide insight into the internal circuitry of the BG more broadly. The
striatum is typically considered an input nucleus of the BG and the pallidum an output nucleus,
suggesting that a signal within the BG would emerge first within the striatum and then later in
pallidum. Instead, we report that generalized uncertainty signals emerge first in pallidum and
later in icbDS and ACC. These findings support more recent theories that implicate the BG in
rapid responses to objects in an environment that can influence future interactions with these
objects.231,232 Indeed, we observed that uncertainty responses in pallidum were very fast to
96

emerge, but that these responses lacked information on specific levels of uncertainty predicted by
an object. In contrast, later signals in ACC and icbDS contained a refined signal of uncertainty,
which significantly discriminating between objects and differentiated between levels of
uncertainty. This supports popular concepts of ACC, which suggest its importance in foraging
and exploration, combining cognitive and motivational variables.4,154,155 These integrated signals
could then be projected to the BG to guide behaviors through known pathways.46–49

Clinically, there are large gaps in our understanding of both how emotion and cognition
are impacted by uncertain states and how the brain alters behaviors during information-seeking
to reduce these states. As a result, mental states associated with mis-evaluation or intolerance of
uncertainty in a patient’s life, such as generalized anxiety disorder238,239, obsessive-compulsive
disorder239–241, and impulsive risk-taking242–244, remain inadequately treated. Indeed, studies
suggested that disease states such as these could, at least in part, be driven by pathology in the
striatum and related cortico-BG pathways. Furthermore, diseases which disrupt normal function
of the striatum have noted consequences on a patient’s ability to accurately gauge levels of
uncertainty and risk in their daily lives.245,246 Bettering our understanding of how the brain
responds to uncertain states and how these states might drive behaviors towards seeking
information to reduce this uncertainty could help to develop more precise interventions for these
ailments.
Ultimately, this work identifies novel mechanisms by which the brain anticipates
uncertainty and motivates behavior towards seeking information to resolve it. It demonstrates
that information-driven behaviors can be reduced by disrupting these mechanisms. Our findings
add to the field’s understanding of interactions within basal ganglia and across cortico-basal
ganglia network motifs and offers insight into how the brain might use analogous cortico-basal
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ganglia networks to motivate the concurrent information-seeking and reward-seeking behaviors
necessary for survival in our complex and uncertain world.
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